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1. Introduction and methodology
1.1 The digitisation of cultural heritage
The purpose of this paper is to explore the legal consequences of the digitisation of cultural heritage
institutions'  archives  and  in  particular  to  establish  whether  digitisation  processes  involve  the
originality required to trigger new copyright or copyright-related protection.1
Frequently, cultural institutions participating in digitisation projects are not fully aware of whether
they possess, or could posses, specific rights stemming from the activity of turning their “physical”
catalogue into a “digital” one. Consequently, they often claim not to be in the legal position to
recognise that the digitised representations  of the originals  are in the public domain or, on the
contrary,  whether  the  digitisation  process  created  a  new  primary  or  derivative  work  or  other
protected subject matter and whom they belong.2 The situation is further complicated by the varying
status of the items that are digitised: the latter can be in the public domain or constitute protected
subject matter in their own right, a condition that may not only influence the final result but the
same possibility to proceed to digitisation in absence of specific authorisation.3
At  the  same  time,  many  cultural  institutions  (but  not  all  of  them,  see  the  example  of  the
Rijksmuseum4) express the concern that allowing an unrestricted reproduction and digitisation of the
works  in  their  collections  would  deprive  them  of  an  important  source  of  income,  which  is  a
compelling issue especially during periods of dire financial crisis and of cutting of public funding to
1  The focus of the study is on the digitisation of “texts” (including books,  newspapers,  letters,  manuscripts,  etc),  “images”
(including paintings, drawings, maps, photos, etc), and “objects” (including statues, sculptures, vases, coins, etc.). Importantly,
the study concentrates on the copyright or copyright related status of digitised items individually considered and therefore the
issue of whether the digitised collection can trigger database rights (copyright or sui generis) is outside the scope of this study.
2  Cultural heritage institutions' ability to digitise their collections is largely based on the public domain status of the latter. When
the copyright, or at least the rights of economic exploitation, elapse, acts such as those here under scrutiny can be performed
without the need to secure authorisation. Alternatively, when the items forming the collections are protected by copyright or
related rights  to  copyright  two possibility  are  available:  relying on fair  use/dealing or  other  Exceptions  or  Limitations  to
Copyright (ELC) or seek the authorisation of the copyright holder.
3  Authorisations required on a legal basis other than the one identified in the research question are not considered in this study,
although they may represent an impediment to digitisation projects. In particular, claims based on database rights (copyright and
sui generis), unfair competition, misappropriation, PPP agreements and other special forms of protection are outside the scope of
this study. An example of special forms of protection are “Cultural Heritage Codes” requiring the authorisation of the competent
Ministry for acts such as reproductions of items listed as cultural heritage. The functioning of these codes, considerations related
to the fact that they may reintroduce a copyright-like form of protection for public domain works not contemplated by the  aquis
communautaire,  and whether this is a power resting with MS or it  has been pre-empted by EU copyright law are also not
discussed in this paper. For an account regarding the basic traits of the Italian and Greek Cultural Heritage Codes, see Morando
2011.
4  See Pekel 2014.
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cultural  institutions.5 Many online projects dealing with digital  images of (often public domain)
works such as paintings and objects of art are constantly facing claims connected with the status of
those digital representations. Examples can be seen in the operations of Europeana and in some
extra-judicial cases involving Wikipedia.6
Likewise,  in  a  recent  document,  the European Commission  (EC) stated  that  a  large  number of
Member States (MS) “reported obstacles in ensuring that public domain material remains in the
public  domain  after  digitisation,  mainly  in  connection  with  photos  and photographers'  rights”.7
Furthermore, the report indicates that “the complex issue of a new layer of rights triggered by the
digitisation process itself in some cases is mentioned as a potential source of legal uncertainty. The
fear of losing control, use of public domain material to generate income and difficulties to assert
public domain status were also reported as possible obstacles ...”. The Commission concludes that
“the legal stand of some digital reproductions of public domain works lacks clarity and requires
further attention”.8 Similar  concerns pointing to the fact that  the “public domain content  in the
analogue world should remain in the public domain in the digital environment” have been expressed
by the High-Level Expert Group on Digital Libraries in 2008.9
In the light of these and similar concerns,  this  paper attempts  to clarify the copyright situation
originating from digitisation projects which, as the Commission and many MS reported, are cause
of  legal  uncertainty.  A major  role  in  this  legally  uncertain  field  is  played  by  the  standard  of
originality which is one of the main requirements for copyright protection. Only when a subject
matter  achieves  the  requested  level  of  originality,  it  can  be  considered  a  work  of  authorship.
Therefore,  a  first  key  issue  analysed  in  this  study is  whether  –  and under  which  conditions  –
digitisation activities can be considered to be original  enough as to constitute  works (usually  a
photographic work) in their own right. A second element of uncertainty is connected with the type
of work eventually created by acts of digitisation. If the process of digitisation of a (protected) work
can be considered authorial, then the resulting work will be a derivative composed by two works:
the original  work digitally  reproduced and the – probably – photographic  work reproducing it.
Finally, a third element of uncertainty is found in the protection afforded to “other photographs” by
the last sentence of Art. 6 Term Directive and implemented in a handful of European countries.
1.2. Research Question, Scope and Methodology
The main research question addressed in this study is the following:
Do acts of digitisation of physical items create new copyright or related rights (e.g. non original
photographs)?
5  For an analysis of the relationship between Cultural Heritage Institutions, the Public Domain and Public Sector Information, see
Communia Policy Paper n.8 “Re-use of public sector information in cultural heritage institutions”, November 2014, available at:
http://www.communia-association.org/policy-papers-2/#policy8
6  See  e.g.  the  National  Portrait  Gallery  and  Wikimedia  Foundation  copyright  dispute  described  at
https  ://  en  . wikipedia  . org  / wiki  / National  _  Portrait  _  Gallery  _  and  _  Wikimedia  _  Foundation  _  copyright  _  dispute.
7  See  the  Report  on  the  Implementation  of  Commission  Recommendation  2011/711/EU  -  Progress  Report  2011-2013  of
September  2014  “Digitisation,  online  accessibility  and  digital  preservation”,  available  at  https  ://  ec  . europa  . eu  / digital  -
agenda  / en  / news  / european  - commissions  - report  - digitisation  - online  - accessibility  - and  - digital  - preservation  - cultural, at 22.
8  Id.
9 See High Level Expert Group on Digital Libraries Sub-group on Public Private Partnerships, Final Report on   Public Private Partnerships for the
Digitisation and Online Accessibility of Europe's Cultural Heritage, May 2008.
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In order to address this question the paper is divided into three parts. Part I is dedicated to the
analysis of copyright law key concepts such as the originality standard, the definition of derivative
works and the forms of protection available in cases of digital (or film-based) representations of
objects (photographs).
The second part of the study is devoted to a survey of a selection of EU Member States in an
attempt to verify how the general concepts identified in Part I are applied by national legislatures
and courts. The selected countries are Germany, France, Spain, Italy, Poland, the Netherlands and
the UK. The country analysis  fulfils  a  double function:  on the  one hand it  provides  a  specific
overview of the national implementation of the solutions found at international and EU level. On
the other hand, it constitutes the only possible approach in order to analyse the protection afforded
by some MS to those “other photographs” (also called non original photographs or mere/simple
photographs)  provided  for  by  the  last  sentence  of  Art.  6  Copyright  Term Directive.10 Part  III
presents  some  conclusions  and  recommendations  for  cultural  heritage  institutions  and  for
legislatures.
The paper's working hypothesis postulates that in a vast majority of situations digitisation processes
do not attract, nor should attract, any form of protection based on copyright and related rights.11
Nonetheless,  in  some  cases,  protection  afforded  by  copyright  and  by  the  neighbouring  right
protecting “other” photographs may be available.  The turning point is the distinction between a
mere  act  of  reproduction  (which  for  copyright  purposes  may  constitute  a  right  of  economic
exploitation  of  a  protected  work)  and  an  act  that  creates  something  new  (a  new  original  or
derivative work or another type of subject matter such as “other” photographs).
The chosen methodology  is  mixed.  The main  research  activity  was based on desk research  of
relevant legislation, case law, policy documents and literature at international, EU and MS level
following a comparative method. This was integrated with a questionnaire administered to selected
legal experts in the 28 EU countries. The list of national correspondents and of covered countries is
available as Annex II.
The questionnaire was divided in two parts. Part I asked four open ended questions on the identified
fundamental  concepts  of  copyright  law:  originality,  derivative  works,  original  photographs  and
neighbouring rights. Part II was based on a hypothetical case study where three different scenarios
were tested. Respondents were asked a number of multiple choice questions. The three scenarios,
while certainly over-simplifying the complex and idiosyncratic dynamics that digitisation activities
follow,  identified  and  summarised  some  of  the  most  common  characteristics  of  digitisation
processes.
The  first  scenario,  labelled  “automated  digitisation”  was  described  as  “Automated  digitisation
realised  in  absence  (or  negligible  presence)  of  human  intervention  (e.g.:  Google  scanning
automatically all books of the entire collection)”. The second scenario, labelled “semi-automated
digitisation” was described as “Automated digitisation realised by a human operator (e.g.: human
operator taking pictures/manually photocopying collections for inventory/classificatory purposes)”.
10  See Directive 2006/116/EC on the term of protection of copyright and certain related rights (codified version); Art 6 reads:
“Photographs which are original in the sense that they are the author's own intellectual creation shall be protected in accordance
with Article 1. No other criteria shall be applied to determine their eligibility for protection. Member States may provide for the
protection of other photographs”.
11  This does not mean that under specific circumstances remedies based on other causes of action, such as unfair competition,
misappropriation, breach of confidence, or sometimes even trade marks, are excluded. However, their eventual availability is not
strictly related with the originality, or lack thereof, in the acts of digitisation and is therefore outside the scope of the present
study.
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The  third  scenario,  called  “human  digitisation”  was  described  as  “Digitisation  operated  by  a
specifically hired professional with the objective to realise high quality outputs (e.g.: photographer
taking  different  shots  in  different  light  conditions  to  create  hi-resolution  images  to  be  made
available on the institution’s website)”.
The questionnaire is available as Annex II.
The results of the questionnaires were of fundamental assistance in the completion of the study.
Furthermore, correspondents contributed by providing documents that were not available in English
or  in  the  other  languages  known  to  the  author.  Where  correspondents  have  provided  specific
documents and helped with translations, this is acknowledged in the study. That being said, all the
possible mistakes are the responsibility of the author alone.
Part I – General Principles
2. Originality
2.1 The international landscape
Originality  is  an essential  requirement  of copyright  law: only works that  show some minimum
amount  of  this  attribute  attract  protection.  Yet,  generally  speaking,  originality  lacks  a  precise
statutory definition.12 None of the major international copyright treaties explicitly define what it is
and which level it has to reach in order to enable copyright to arise, bringing a leading scholar in the
field  to  state  that  “So  far  as  a  particular  threshold  standard for  protection  is  concerned,  the
requirements [of the Berne Convention] arise chiefly as a matter of inference, requiring the reader
to  work  through  a  number  of  different  provisions”.13 Indeed,  the  Berne  Convention  for  the
protection of artistic and literary works of 188614, the oldest and most relevant Convention in the
field, only postulate a general requirement of originality indirectly and implicitly. Art. 2(1) of the
Convention dedicated to “Protected Works” merely establishes that:
12  See generally Ricketson & Ginsburg, 2006, especially at 8.05; Bently & Sherman, 2014, at 93; Cornish, Llewelyn & Aplin,
2013, at 11-04; Gervais & Judge, 2005, at 16; Goldstein & Hugenholtz, 2013, at 192; Ginsburg, 1992; Gervais, 2002; Gravells,
2007; Judge & Gervais, 2010; Schricker 1995.
13  See Ricketson 2009, at 59.
14  See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works of September 9, 1886 revised in Paris on July 24 1971
and amended on September 28, 1979 (Berne Convention Paris Text).
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“[T]he expression “literary and artistic works” shall include every production in the
literary,  scientific  and  artistic  domain,  whatever  may  be  the  mode  or  form  of  its
expression …”
The same Article then provides an illustrative list of works included in such a broad definition.
Books and other writings,  lectures,  choreographic works, musical  compositions with or without
words,  cinematographic  works,  works  of  drawing,  painting,  architecture,  sculpture,  engraving,
photographic  works,  works  of  applied  art,  illustrations,  maps  and  plans  are  all  examples  of
protected works. Similar lists are found in most national Copyright Acts.15
As it can be seen, “originality” is not explicitly mentioned as a requirement in the general clause or
in the list present in Art. 2(1).16 All the same, the word “original” is not completely absent from the
Convention. It can be found in Art. 2(3) dealing with “translations, adaptations, arrangements …
and other alterations”, which are protected as original works.17 A similar provision is present in Art.
14-bis dealing with cinematographic works.18
Another useful element related to the presence of an originality element in Berne can be found in
Art. 2 Section 5 which reads:
“Collections of literary or artistic works such as encyclopaedias and anthologies
which, by reason of the selection and arrangement of their contents, constitute
intellectual  creations shall  be  protected  as  such,  without  prejudice  to  the
copyright in each of the works forming part of such collections”
Similarly to the above mentioned case of translations, collections of literary or artistic works can be
protected as autonomous – yet derivative – forms of expression. Not every collection is eligible,
though:  only  those  that  by  reason  of  the  selection  or  arrangement  of  their  contents  constitute
“intellectual  creations”.19 This  last  expression does  not  only  states  that  a  form of  originality  is
necessary in order to trigger protection, but it also gives some more information regarding the type
of originality required: intellectual creations.
The requisite of “intellectual creations” is noteworthy as it does not only apply to Art. 2(5), i.e. to
collections of literary and artistic works, but it extends to all the subject matter covered by Art. 2.20
It has been said that an explicit definition of “intellectual creations” was indispensable only for the
case of Art. 2(5), because the originality inherent in collections, as opposed to that in the works
15  See infra Part II.
16  See Ricketson & Ginsburg 2006, at 8.87.
17  The word “original” is used twice in the same article 2(3) with two different meanings “Translations, adaptations, arrangements
of  music  and other  alterations of  a  literary or  artistic  work shall  be protected as  original works without  prejudice to  the
copyright in the original work”. This should not lead to any confusion as the plain meaning of the article is clear; See Ricketson
& Ginsburg, 2006, at 8.87
18  See Art. 14-bis(1) BC; Ricketson 2009, at 55.
19  As it is well known, the English version of the Berne Convention incorrectly reports “selection AND arrangement” however the
original official French text speaks of “selection OR arrangement”, and this is the version that in case of contrast prevails.
Therefore, even if the English translations still nowadays reports AND, the real requirement is – and has always been – OR; See
Ricketson & Ginsburg, 2006, 8.87.
20  “A line therefore seems to run from art.2(5) through art.2(3) to art.2(1) as follows: ‘‘original translations, adaptations, etc.’’
under art.2(5) and collections of works that are ‘‘intellectual creations’’ under art.2(3) are to be protected as ‘‘literary and artistic
works’’ under art.2(1), suggesting that both originality and intellectual creation are correlative and implicit requirements for
literary and artistic productions that otherwise fall under art.2(1)”; See Ricketson 2009, at 57.
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collected, “may not be as readily discernible”.21 Accordingly, not only collections but also any other
scientific  or  literary  work  such  as  books,  lectures,  musical  compositions,  songs,  works  of
photography, and sketches, in order to comply with Berne standards have to possess the required
type of originality, i.e. they have to be intellectual creations.22 What this exactly entails, how high –
or low – the level of originality is, and what are the tests, standards, and elements that can fill-up
with content the concept of intellectual creation is, however, a matter for national legislatures and
courts.23
Traditionally, common law countries have phrased the requirement of originality in the sense that
the work must originate with the author, i.e. must not be copied, and it must be the result of “skill,
judgement  and/or  labour”  or  of  his  “sweat  of  the brow”.24 Within  those countries,  the US and
Canada developed their own standards.25 The U.S. after Feist require a modicum of creativity which
implies a higher degree of originality than the traditional skill, judgement and labour.26 In Canada
the Supreme Court in CCH created a new standard that in the same words of the Court is higher
than the one historically applied in the UK but does not require creativity as in the U.S.27 Other
countries  of  this  family,  e.g.  Australia  and  the  same  UK,  have  likewise  adjusted  their  own
standard.28
Countries belonging to civil law traditions, instead, have shown the tendency to stress the personal
dimension or personal input that the author puts into the work.29 This difference, however, should
not be misinterpreted, as often it is more declamatory than material. Historically, a rather low level
of originality can be seen also in civil law countries, especially in relation to certain subject matter
such as catalogues or technical manuals (e.g. kleine Münze or petite monnaie).30
These  different  conceptualizations  of  originality  are  all  compatible  with  the  Berne  mandated
requisite of “intellectual  creations” since,  as it  has been noted,  the determination of the precise
meaning is left to national laws and tribunals. While it is arguable that the product of the “sweat of
the  brow” may  be  less  “creative”  than  that  of  an  “oeuvres  de  l'esprit”  or  of  a  “minimum  of
creativity”, it is fundamental to consider the extremely high variance not only within the same legal
tradition  but  even within the same legal  system of what  has  been held protectable  in  different
historical periods.31
21  Id.; See Gervais, 2002.
22  This corresponds also to the view of the ECJ, see  Infopaq, at 34.
23  Id.; Gervais, 2002; Ginsburg, 1992.
24  This is the classical formula historically employed by courts in common law countries and especially in the UK, although the
precise wording varied over time adding or substituting elements; See Bently & Sherman, 2014, at 96; Cornish, Llewelyn &
Aplin, 2013, at 11-04. As it is known the US requires a minimum of creativity; See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv.
Co.,  499 U.S.  340,  346 (1991); Nimmer, 2014,  at  Sec.  2.08.  The Canadian Supreme Court more recently has embraced a
standard which lies between the lower end of the skill and judgment – also known as “sweat of the brow” doctrine” – and the US
standard of creativity; See CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339; Gervais, 2002.
25  See Judge & Gervais, 2010, at 378.
26  See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991).
27  See CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339.
28  For the UK see infra Sec 10. For Australia see  Fitzgerald & Atkinson, 2011.
29  France requires “oeuvre de l'esprit”, Germany personal intellectual creations, Italy works of ingenuity of creative character; See
Goldstein & Hugenholtz, 2013, 192 – 193.
30  Id.; Lucas & Lucas, 2012 at 121.
31  For  an  analysis  of  the  philosophical  traditions  justifying  copyright  (and  intellectual  property  rights  more  generally)  see
generally Gordon, 1993; Merges, 2007.
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A last important aspect deserving attention is that the required level of originality, the intellectual
creation, has to be present in the expression of an idea, not in the idea itself. This basic principle is
once again only implicitly enshrined in the Berne Convention which, as seen, only states that:
“The expression “literary and artistic works” shall include every production in
the literary, scientific and artistic domain, whatever may be the mode or form of
its expression, such as … ”
A more explicit statement in this sense can be found in Art. 2 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT)
of 1996, and in the specular Art. 9(2) of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS) of 1994 which respectively establish that:
“Copyright  protection  [shall]  extend[s]  to  expressions  and  not  to  ideas,
procedures, methods of operation or mathematical concepts as such”.32
According to this basic principle of copyright law, it is not sufficient that an original idea takes
shape in the mind of an author, but that idea needs to be expressed in an original form that can be
perceived by others; this principle is also known as the idea-expression dichotomy.33
2.2 The European Acquis Communautaire
As seen in the previous chapter, the standard of originality has always been a matter of national law.
Different jurisdictions have traditionally implemented different standards, which have varied from
country to country. Moreover, within the same country variations are observable in function of the
specific period of time and subject matter.
Until relatively recently, EU law did not regulate the standard of originality, nor copyright more
generally. The reason for this situation can be found in the absence of a clear and direct attribution
of powers to the EU to regulate copyright (principle of conferral).34 Since its creation, and until
recently, the main basis for EU intervention in the field of copyright were Articles 26 and 114 of the
Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the  European  Union (TFEU),35 which  have  given  the  EU  the
competence to respectively adopt measures with the aim of establishing or ensuring the functioning
32  See Art. 2 “Scope of copyright protection” of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty, adopted in
Geneva on December 20, 1996; and Art. 9(2) “Relation to the Berne Convention” of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual  Property  Rights  (TRIPS),  signed  in  Marrakesh  on  15  April  1994,  as  Annex 1C of  the  Marrakesh  Agreement
Establishing  the  World  Trade  Organization.  The  two provisions  are  virtually  identical,  with  the  only  difference  being  the
presence of the auxiliary “shall” in the TRIPS definition.
33  See e.g. the U.S Supreme Court decision in  Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985) “copyright's idea/
expression dichotomy strikes a definitional balance between the First Amendment and the Copyright Act by permitting free
communication of facts while still protecting an author's expression". A similar statement is present in art. 1(2) of the European
Software Directive “protection … shall apply to the expression … of a computer program. Ideas and principles … are not
protected”. In the ECJ jurisprudence the idea/expression dichotomy can be found in the case Case C 393/09  Bezpečnostní
softwarová asociace v Ministerstvo kultury, (BSA) at 49: “... where the expression of those components is dictated by their
technical function, the criterion of originality is not met, since the different methods of implementing an idea are so limited that
the idea and the expression become indissociable”. For an analysis of the concept of authorship in emerging social practices see
Bently & Biron, 2014, at 243.
34  Art. 5 TEU (Treaty on the European Union) enshrines the principle of “conferral” on the basis of which the Union shall act only
within the limits of the competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties. See generally Benabou, 1997.
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of the internal market and the approximation of the laws of Member States.36 Eventually, this lack
of  direct  attribution  of  powers  to  regulate  copyright  in  a  systematic  way eventually  led to  the
fragmentary  and  subject-matter  specific  approach  taken  by  EU copyright  directives,  especially
during 1990s.37
The 1990s, though, also witnessed growing divergences in national originality standards of specific
subject matter such as software, a trend that became of major concern for the EC. 38 The possible
obstacles to intra-Community trade and the consequent negative impact on the smooth functioning
of the internal market that divergent threshold of originality could entail convinced the Commission
to take action in specific fields. However, besides a handful of legislatively harmonised subject
matter – which as it will be seen infra comprised software, photographs and databases – the EU
legislature did not reach the conclusion that a general and “horizontal” harmonisation of the concept
of originality was necessary.39
2.2.1) The vertically harmonised standard of originality in EU copyright
law
The result of the reported lack of direct attribution of powers in copyright law, combined with the
internal market relevance of diverging originality standards, led to a “vertical” harmonisation (i.e.
through legislative interventions regulating only specifically identified subject matter) of software40,
databases41 and  photographs42.  In  recent  years,  however,  that  standard  has  been  extended
“horizontally” to all kinds of works covered by EU copyright law. This horizontal expansion has
been operated by way of interpretation – and not without criticisms – by the European Court of
Justice,  which  established  that  any  work  covered  by  EU copyright  law is  original  if  it  is  the
35  There are other basis for EU legislative intervention in the Treaties, such as Arts. 53 (freedom of establishment), 167 (common
cultural heritage), and 169 (consumer protection); nonetheless Art. 114 remains the single principal source of powers used to
regulate copyright. See M. van Eechoud, B. Hugenholtz, S. van Gompel, L. Guibault, N. Helberger, 2009, at 1.2.2.
36  The Green Paper on Copyright and the Challenge of Technology – Copyright Issues requiring immediate action, COM(88) 172,
June 1988. Other interventions in the field of intellectual property can be seen in Directive 89/104/EEC on the approximation of
trade mark laws (now replaced by Directive 2008/95/EC), and Directive 87/54/EEC on the legal protection of topographies.
Recently, Art. 118 was introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon of 2007 empowering the EU to create European intellectual property
rights. It must be noted, however, that Art. 118 has enabled the creation of “uniform” intellectual property rights as opposed to
“harmonising” the laws of Member States (MS). Accordingly, Art. 118 constitutes the legal basis for the creation of a unitary
title, indicatively through a EU Regulation, which is directly applicable in all MS.
37  This  can be  observed  in  different  documents  of  the EC.  In  the 1988 Green Paper, for  example,  it  can be  read that  the
“Commission concluded that a directive on the legal protection of computer programs is a necessary step for the completion of
the internal  market”  and that  “the  creation of  a  European information  services  market,  currently divided  by juridical  and
linguistic barriers, is of prime importance”; See Green Paper 1988 at 5.4.1 and 6.2.1.
38  For a detailed analysis of the EU competences in the harmonisation of copyright law and the role of the internal market see
Ramalho, 2014.
39  See Commission Staff Working Paper on the Review of the EC legal framework in the Field of Copyright and Related Rights,
SEC(2004) 995.
40  Directive 2009/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the legal protection of computer
programs (Codified version), art. 1(3).
41  Directive 96/9 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the legal protection of databases, art. 3(1).
42  Directive 2006/116/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on the term of protection of
copyright and certain related rights (codified version), art. 6.
Page 10 of 69
“author’s own intellectual  creation”.43 This section deals with vertical  legislative harmonisation,
while the horizontal judiciary one is analysed in the next Section.
a) Software
The concept of “author's own intellectual creation” appeared for the first time in EU copyright law
in the Software Directive of 1991. The reasons that brought the EC to require such a standardised
level  of  originality  across  the  EU are  explained  in  the  Green Paper  of  1988 and relate  to  the
emergence of different standards of protection for software in various EU countries. As the 1988
Green Paper reports, in MS such as France and Germany courts offered protection to software only
under  specific  conditions  that  differed  from  the  originality  standard  usually  required  in  those
countries for other subject matter. This course of action was a source of concern to the European
Commission which interpreted it as a potential threat capable of jeopardizing the internal market.44
Nevertheless,  the 1988 Green Paper did not  provide the final  formulation of the “author's  own
intellectual creation” standard which will eventually be found in the Software Directive. Yet, the
Green Paper showed the direction, by pointing to a definition present in the Topography Directive
enacted only one year before.45 According to that directive, topographies are protected if they are
the result of the “creator's own intellectual effort” and are not commonplace in the field.46 This
concept of originality, it has been argued, is closer to the English and Irish originality standards than
to those of continental MS.47
As pointed out by Walter and Von Lewinski, the notion of originality underwent different drafting
phases and the expression “author's own intellectual creation” appeared for the first time in the
Initial Proposal's Explanatory Memorandum and was carried over into the EC Amended Proposal.48
The Amended Proposal definition of originality was included into the final text of the Software
Directive,  in  accordance  to  which  a  computer  program  is  original  if  it  is  the  author's  own
intellectual creation and no other criteria such as qualitative or aesthetic merits should be applied.49
In recognizing this approach, the British and Irish standards of originality have probably prevailed
over the originality standards of those continental European countries requiring particularly high
level  of  creativity  or  aesthetic  contribution  for  the  protection  of  software.50 Nevertheless,  the
formula adopted in the Software Directive possesses an undeniable nature of compromise intended
to  reconcile  the  British  and  Irish  understanding  of  originality  with  that  of  continental  EU
countries.51 This aspect – it has been argued – can be seen for instance in the choice of words which
43  See van Eechoud, 2012; Bently, 2012; Case C-5/08 Infopaq International A/S v Danske Dagblades Forening, of 16 July 2009
(Infopaq); C-393/09 Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace v. Ministerstvo kultury, of 22 December 2010 (BSA); Joined Cases C-
403/08 and C-429/08 Football Association Premier League and Others [2011] (FAPL); Case C-145/10 Eva-Maria Painer [2011]
(Painer); Case C-604/10 Football Dataco v Yahoo [2012] (Football Dataco v Yahoo).
44  See Green Paper 1988 at 5.6.3 et seq.
45  Directive 87/54/EEC on the legal protection of topographies.
46  See Green Paper 1988 at 5.6.7.
47  See  Walter  &  Von  Lewinski,  2010,  at  5.1.8.  See  also  the  Original  Proposal  for  a  Directive  on  the  Legal  Protection  of
Topographies  of  Semiconductor  Products  COM(85)  775  final,  Ch.  2,  Art.  2,  n.21  (“Art.  2(3)  excludes  from  protection
topographies that … are not the result of their creator's own intellectual effort, that is, those that are themselves copies ...)”; in a
similar direction, the Report on the Proposal from the European Commission for a Directive on the Protection of Original
Topographies,  produced by the European Parliament,  Doc.  A 2-88/86 of 16 July 1986,  Sec.  B,  n.  6-7,  [Rapporteur Mr. A.
Turner].
48  Id., at 5.1.9.
49  See Recital 8 Directive 91/250/EEC of 14 May 1991; van Gompel & Lavik, 2013.
50  See  Walter & Von Lewinski, 2010, at 5.1.10 et seq.
51  Id., 5.1.16.
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combines expressions typical of continental European countries (intellectual creations) with those
typical of countries such as the UK and Ireland (author's own, in the sense the work must originate
with its author, i.e. not being copied).52
In  the  2000  EC  Report  on  the  Implementation  of  the  Computer  Program  Directive53,  the  EC
recognised that the level of originality for software had been harmonised for the first time all over
the EU, noting that “12 Member States lower[ed] the threshold for granting protection and the
remaining three "lift[ed] the bar”.54 In particular, the EC noted on the one hand that countries such
as  Germany  had  abandoned  their  previous  (higher)  requirement  of  protection  for  computer
programs (Schöpfungshöhe), while on the other hand, the UK had not yet implemented the new EU
standard.  This  lack  of  compliance  with  EU law could  prove,  the  EC pointed  out,  particularly
problematic as the UK traditionally offered a lower standard of protection, i.e. skill and labour.55
b) Photographs
The second directive proceeding to a vertical harmonization of the originality standard is the Term
Directive, which mandates that photographs which are original in the sense that they are the author's
own intellectual creation shall be protected by copyright and that no other criteria should be applied
to determine their eligibility for protection (in Art. 6).56
The strong similarity  to  the definition  found in the Software Directive  is  apparent,  as it  is  the
character of compromise of the Directive. Not surprisingly, the Software Directive has been used as
a reference model especially for the determination of the standard of originality for photographs.57
The original directive of 199358 stated that in order to achieve a sufficient harmonization of the term
of protection – the main goal of that legislative act – photographic works, which due to their artistic
or professional character are of importance within the internal market, have to be governed by a
harmonised level of originality.59 In the 2006 codification of the Term Directive this reference to
artistic  or professional character  disappeared,  but it  has been submitted that the change has not
modified the standard.60
An important  aspect  in  the protection  of photographs under  EU law is  to  be found in the last
sentence  of  Art.  6  which  reads  that  “Member  States  may  provide  for  the  protection  of  other
photographs”. Differently from other “special” forms of protection, the regulation of non original
photographs is completely left to MS.61 While the protection afforded to photographs at the Member
State level was particularly inhomogeneous and complicated by the fact that some MS offered a
double-tier system of protection, the harmonising effects of this type of provision are not entirely
clear.62 Allegedly,  the  explanation  for  what  could  be  defined  as  an  unsatisfactory  approach  to
harmonisation (since “Le critère d'originalité … risque de perdre de son importance pratique”) is
52  Id.
53  Report  from the  Commission  to  the  Council,  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Economic  and  Social  Committee  on  the
implementation and effects of Directive 91/250/EEC on the legal protection of computer programs COM (2000) 0199 final.
54  Id., at III.
55  Id, at V.1(e).
56  See Art. 6 Directive 2006/116/EC (codified version).
57 See Walter & Von Lewinski, 2010, at 8.6.10.
58   Directive 93/98/EEC (now repealed) and substituted by Directive . 2006/116/EC).
59  See Recital 17 Directive 93/98/EEC.
60  See Walter & Von Lewinski, 2010, at 8.6.10.
61  Id. See also Perry & Margoni, 2011.
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probably to be found once again in the character of compromise of the legislative instrument rather
than in a clear policy view.63 In fact, it has been pointed out that the inclusion of the author’s own
intellectual creation harmonised standard for photography was “accidental”.64
At the domestic level, countries that implement a specific neighbouring right protecting non original
photographs include Germany, Austria, Spain, Italy and the Scandinavian countries.65 The complete
lack of harmonising pointers, though, left MS the with widest discretion possible regarding the type
of protection. For instance, it has been argued that this legal framework allowed the UK to offer
protection to non original photographs under the current wording of the CDPA at the only condition
that photographs are not copied66(but see infra for an analysis of the UK situation).67
c) Database
The Database Directive offers copyright protection to databases which, by reason of the selection or
arrangement of their contents, constitute the author's own intellectual creation and no other criteria
shall be applied to determine their eligibility for that reproduction.68 Once again, a strong similarity
of  the  requirements  for  protection  can  be  traced to  the  Software  Directive.  This  intention  was
confirmed by the EC which underlined the similar creative processes at the basis of databases and
computer programs. Moreover, the European Commission stressed that computer programs are an
essential component in database management.69
Furthermore, an important aspect of the Database Directive is the double-tier protection system that
it creates. In addition to the copyright, the directive creates a sui generis form of protection for
substantial investments in the obtaining, verifications and presentation of a database. This form of
protection is different and autonomous from the one based on copyright and does not require any
originality.
Significantly, it must be noted that the two forms of protection operate independently from each
other and can be both present for the same database. The crucial aspect is that they protect two
totally different goods: originality in the selection or arrangement of the database in the case of
copyright;  the  substantial  investment  in  the  obtaining,  verification  and  presentation  (but  not
creation!) of the data the sui generis right.70
62  See Proposal for a Council Directive harmonising the term of protection of copyright and certain related rights, COM(92) 33
Final, part I n. 9.
63  See Benabou, 1997, at 385.
64  See van Eechoud, 2012, at 62.
65  For a general overview on the protection of photographies in international law see Gendrau, Nordermann & Oesch 1999. See
also Walter & Von Lewinski, 2010, at 8.6.13, where, however, the Netherlands are erroneously indicated as being included in the
Initial Proposal Explanatory Memorandum list of countries granting special protection to common photographs.
66  See Walter & Von Lewinski, 2010, at 8.6.12.
67  See Bently & Sharman, 2014, at 115.
68  See Art. 3 Database Directive.
69  See Walter & Von Lewinski, 2010, at 9.3.7.
70  See Hugenholtz & Davison, 2005, at 113-118; Hugenholtz, 2005; Margoni T., Guibault L. et al.,  Possible Forms of Legal
Protection, in Guibault & Wiebe, 2013.
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2.2.2)  The  ECJ   and  the  “horizontal”  expansion  of  the  originality
standard
Between 2009 and 2012, in five landmark decisions (Infopaq, BSA, FAPL, Painer and Football
Dataco v Yahoo71) the ECJ took the opportunity to elaborate on the precise contours of the EU
originality standard, which can be summarized as follows:
1)  Under  EU  copyright  law  the  required  originality  standard  is  the  “author's  own intellectual
creation”.  This  standard  applies  horizontally  to  all  subject  matter  covered  by  EU  copyright
directives.72
2) The author's own intellectual creation is present when authors can exercise free and creative
choices and put their personal stamp in the work.73
3) When an expression is determined by technical or functional rules, such as when there is only
one way to express an idea, or the expression is predetermined by a specific goal or constrained by
narrow rules which leave no space to free and creative choices no originality can be present.74
Additionally,  a  fourth  point  can  be  inferred  from these  cases.  Whereas  the  evocative  wording
employed by the Court could suggest that the AOIC requirement is particularly high, a closer look
at the facts decided may indicate a different outcome. The ECJ recognised protection – or at least
held that  “it  could not  be excluded” – to  an 11 word extract75,  to a portrait  photograph76,  to a
graphical user interface77 and to a programming language78 provided that they constitute the author's
own intellectual  creation –something for national  courts  to be determined.  Match fixtures79 and
sports  games80 were nonetheless  excluded from protection  due to  the  lack  of  free and creative
choices.
Consequently, it  may  be  argued that  the  new standard  created  by  the  Court  gives  much more
emphasis  to  the qualitative rather  than  the quantitative type  of  authorial  contributions.81
Accordingly, a fourth point may be formulated:
4) It suffices to reach the required level of originality that authors make some free and creative
choices and therewith put their personal stamp onto the work. However, skill and labour, even in
71  Case C 5/08 Infopaq International [2009] (Infopaq); Case C 393/09 Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace [2010] (BSA); Joined
Cases C 403/08 and C 429/08 Football Association Premier League and Others [2011] (FAPL); Case C 145/10 Painer [2011]
(Painer); and Case C 604/10 Football Dataco v Yahoo [2012] (Football Dataco v Yahoo). Other two important decisions are:
Case C-168/09 Flos v Semeraro [2011] (Flos) which expands the author's own intellectual creation to copyright protection of
unregistered designs, whereas, for registered designs the situation is not yet clear; See Bently, 2012; and Case C 406/10  SAS
Institute v World Programming [2012] (SAS) which states that programming languages and data file formats can be protected as
works – other than a computer program – if they are the author's own intellectual creation.
72  See Infopaq, at 36.
73  See Football Dataco v Yahoo, at 38;  Infopaq, at 45; BSA, at 50; and Painer, at 89 and 92.
74  See FAPL, at 98; BSA, at 49; and Football Dataco v Yahoo, at 39.
75  See Infopaq.
76  See Painer.
77  See BSA.
78  See SAS.
79  See Football Dataco.
80  See FAPL.
81  Similarly, identifying the specific areas where the new EU standard and the “old” British one overlap and where they differ, see
Bently & Sherman 2014, at 102.
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significant amounts, are not conducive to these free and creative choices and therefore do not lead
to the creation of a work possessing the required originality.82
In Infopaq,  the  first  ground-breaking  decision  of  the  ECJ  in  the  originality  “saga”,  the  Court
underlined that it is apparent from the general scheme of the Berne Convention, in particular Article
2(5)  and  2(8),  that  the  protection  of  such  certain  subject  matter  as  artistic  or  literary  works
presupposes that they are intellectual creations.83 Similarly, other works (i.e. computer programs,
databases and photographs) are protected by copyright only if they are original in the sense that they
are  their  author’s  own  intellectual  creation.84 The  ECJ  further  stressed  that,  in  establishing  a
harmonised legal framework for copyright, the Infosoc Directive is based on the same principle, as
evidenced by Recitals 4, 9 to 11 and 20 in the preamble thereof.85 In accordance to the Court's
ruling, copyright within the meaning of Art. 2(a) of the Infosoc Directive is liable to apply only in
relation to a subject matter which is original in the sense that it  is its author’s own intellectual
creation.86 
These words, successively confirmed in the other decisions under analysis, represent the crucial
transition from a partially harmonised to a fully harmonised standard of originality.87
The extent to which the fully harmonised level of originality covers the field of industrial design is
not  yet  completely  clear. In Case C-168/09 Flos  v Semeraro,  the ECJ was asked to determine
whether a moratorium in respect of copyright protection for industrial design was compatible with
Art. 17 and 19 of Directive 98/71/EC on the protection of Designs. While the Court's ruled against
such compatibility, another  aspect  is  relevant  for  the case of originality, one that  attracted  less
attention than what might have deserved.88
At paragraph 34 the Court states:
“However, it  is  conceivable that  copyright  protection for works  which may be
unregistered designs could arise under other directives concerning copyright, in
particular Directive 2001/29, if the conditions for that directive’s application are
met, a matter which falls to be determined by the national court”.
The reasons why the European Court of Justice chose to take explicit position on this matter, which
goes beyond what the referring court asked, are not entirely clear. A possible explanation is that in
paragraph  34  the  Court  operated  an  additional  extension  of  the  concept  of  the  author's  own
intellectual creation doctrine and covered the field of industrial design. This view seems supported
by the Opinion of AG Jääskinen in Case C-5/11, even though the relevant passages were not carried
over into the Court's judgement.89
82  See Football Dataco v Yahoo, at 53 (1) “the significant labour and skill required for setting up that database cannot as such
justify such a protection if they do not express any originality in the selection or arrangement of the data which that database
contains”.
83  See Infopaq, at 34. Arts. 2(5) and 2(8) of the Berne Convention respectively deal with collections of literary or artistic works
which constitutes 'intellectual creations' and with news of the day having the character or mere items of press information.
84  Id., at 35.
85  Id., at 36.
86  Id., at 37.
87  See Cornish, Llewelyn & Aplin, 2013, at 11.10.
88  Except for the already extensively cited Bently, 2012; See also Griffiths, 2013; Derclaye, 2014; Koenraad, 2013.
89  See Case C-5/11 Criminal proceedings against Titus Alexander Jochen Donner, at 27 – 31. For a detailed analysis of the
decision and for an explanation of its possible implications see Bently, 2012.
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Two  major  obstacles  to  the  conclusion  of  a  full  harmonisation  of  the  originality  standard  in
industrial design should however be considered: Firstly, the plain meaning of Art. 17 of the Design
Directive and of Art. 96 of the Design Regulation (the Regulation is not considered in the Flos case,
however), which allow Member States to determine the extent to which, and the conditions under
which, such a protection is conferred, explicitly including the level of originality required.90 This
approach seems supported, e.g. by the decision of the Supreme Court of Norway in the Tripp-Trapp
case.91
Secondly, the distinction between registered and unregistered designs, and in particular the fact that
the  Directive  only  harmonises  the  protection  of  national  registered  design,  and not  of  national
unregistered,  Community  registered  and  Community  unregistered  designs.  Accepting  an
harmonised concept of originality for unregistered designs, would ostensibly create two different
thresholds  of  originality  depending  on  whether  the  design  is  registered  or  not  and  where
(community v. national?), a contradiction aggravated by the fact that an unregistered community
design can be registered during the one year grace period.
In conclusion, and putting the issue of industrial design aside for the moment, the newly defined
level of originality can be said to be placed in between the high standard expressed in the past by
some national courts (e.g. Germany), at least in relation to certain subject matter such as software,
and the low standard sometimes provided by UK courts (“sweat of the brow”). This reading seems
in line with the legislative history of the Directives that vertically harmonised the requirement of
originality.92
An aspect worth noting, however, is the view expressed by AG Mengozzi in its opinion in  Football
Dataco v. Yahoo, in which he pointed out that the expression author's own intellectual creation
“echoes a formula which is typical of the continental copyright tradition”. This seems to contradict
the legislative history exposed above, which documented that the AOIC expression – at least in the
original formulation drafted for computer programs – was a compromise standard, that, if closer to
any tradition, it would be to that of common law rather than civil law countries.93 If the statement of
the AG is correct, it should be logically inferred that the ECJ did not only expand the concept of
AOIC beyond the three vertically harmonised subject matter.94 The ECJ also modified the ambit of
application of AOIC as originally conceived and moved it closer to the continental formula, in spite
of its original construction.95
2.2.3) The effects of AOIC on Member State domestic laws
The effects of the ECJ author's own intellectual creation doctrine on national courts and standards
have only recently started to unfold. Certainly, the new EU standard is unique and pervasive in the
sense that no other tests are allowed under domestic laws. However, it will be a matter for national
courts to establish whether a specific work meets the AOIC definition.  In so doing it is safe to
90  See in general Margoni, 2013.
91  See Supreme Court of Norway, 27 June 2012, n. HR-2012-01325-A, (case no. 2011/2020) [Tripp-Trapp case].
92  See Green Paper on Copyright and the Challenge of Technology – Copyright Issues Requiring Immediate Action, COM (88)
172 final, at 5.6.4.
93  See above fn 2.2.1.a)
94  Although the element  of  a  “personal  stamp of  the author” was originally introduced by the  EU legislature  in  the Term
Directive.
95  For a recent analysis of the ECJ jurisprudence on originality see Derclaye 2014, at 718; Griffiths 2013.
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assume that courts will be guided – consciously or unconsciously – by their own traditional legal
constructions. Legal-cultural concepts are usually deeply rooted in the minds of law practitioners
and interpreters and tend to survive, at least initially, legal or judicial reforms.96
That being said, one aspect can certainly be considered settled: the extent to which national legal
systems recognised a different level of originality other than that attributed to software, databases
and photographs is  not  compliant  with  Union law any longer. Currently, only  one  standard  of
originality applies to all subject matter covered by EU copyright law. There may be an exception
connected  to  registered  designs  on  the  basis  of  Arts.  17  and  96  of  respectively  the  Design
Directive97 and the Design Regulation98, but, as seen above, the relationship of these exceptions
with the ECJ Flos decision is not yet settled.99
Regarding  the  implementation  of  the  AOIC standard  by  national  courts,  it  is  likely  that  most
national courts will “import” the new ECJ test and, as far as they can, interpret it in a way that will
correspond to their own traditional standards. In some countries this is made particularly likely by
an undeniable similarity in the definitions of originality. This is for example the case in Germany,
where works are protected as long as they are the “personal intellectual creation of an author”.
Other cases of similarity, even if not so straightforward, can be seen in France and Italy where
works  are  protected  if  they  are oeuvres  de  l'esprit –  underscoring  therefore  both  the  author's
presence  and the  intellectual  personal  element  –  or  if  they  are opere dell'ingegno  di  carattere
creativo, underlying both the presence of a personal stamp and of an intellectual creation.
Yet,  it  is clear that it  is not at  the terminological level that the issue will be solved, but at  the
interpretative one. Under this perspective, UK courts have already had occasion to state that the
new ECJ standard restates, but does not substantially change the legal situation.100
Likewise, the Dutch Supreme Court held that the new EU standard is in line with the one commonly
employed by courts in the Netherlands101 and the Dutch government repealed the part of the Dutch
Copyright Act that granted protection to non original writings, precisely as a consequence of the
Football Dataco v. Yahoo decision.102
In a 2013 case, the Supreme Court of Belgium confirmed that in light of the ECJ case law and in
particular of Painer a work – specifically a fireplace design – is original if it  is the intellectual
creation of the author bearing his personal stamp.103 This ruling reversed a previous decision of the
same Court holding that the “personal stamp” element was not required under Belgian law.104
In conclusion, it is likely that when courts start consistently implementing the new AOIC standard
they will still argue that a given work was the result of free and creative choices on the basis of their
traditional categories to the extent that this is still possible. Beyond this limit courts (or legislatures)
96  See in general Rouland, 1994.
97  Directive 98/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 1998 on the legal protection of designs.
98  Council Regulation (EC) No 6/2002 of 12 December 2001 on Community designs.
99  See Case C 168/09 Flos SpA v Semeraro Casa e Famiglia SpA [2011] (Flos); Opinion of the Advocate General in Case C-5/11
(Criminal proceedings against Titus Alexander Jochen Donner), of 2012, at fn 14; See L. Bently, 2012.
100  However “the full implications of the decision have not yet been worked out”; see NLA v Meltwater [2010] EWHC 3099 (Ch) at
81 (aff'd [2011] EWCA Civ 890).
101  See Supreme Court 23 February 2013 ( Stokke/H3 Products) para. 4.2.
102  See Beunen A.,Geschriftenbescherming: The Dutch Protection for Non-original Writings, in Hugenholtz B., Quaedvlieg A.,
Visser D., 2012.
103  See  Supreme Court of Belgium, 31 October 2013, n. C.12.0263.N/1 [M-Design Benelux SPRL].
104  See  Supreme Court of Belgium, 26 January 2012, n. C.11.0108.N [Artessuto case].
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will probably need to abandon the old standard. Nevertheless, where to draw the line will likely be
the object of a fair amount of national court decisions in the years to come.
3. Derivative works
Derivative works (e.g. translations, adaptations and other alterations) have received more explicit
attention in international conventions than the concept of originality. An example of this attention
can be seen, for instance, in the Berne Convention where a few Articles indicate that some works,
although based on other works, deserve autonomous (yet derivative) protection. At the EU level, a
recently decided case may have revamped the interest on derivative works and on the harmonisation
of the right to create adaptations.
3.1 The international landscape
The expression derivative works refers to those works that are based on pre-existing works. From
this point of view derivative works are not “primary” works, such as those listed in Art. 2(1) BC,
but  “secondary”.105 Derivative  works  possess  therefore  the  potential  of  being  a  copyright
infringement inasmuch as they require the adaptation, transformation, alteration, or translation of
pre-existing works.106
Accordingly, when the Berne Convention states that
“Translations, adaptations, arrangements of music and other alterations of a literary or
artistic work shall be protected as original works without prejudice to the copyright in
the original work”107
it employs the adjective original in two completely different ways. The first “original” refers to the
concept of “intellectual creations” discussed in Sec. 2 above, whereas the second “original” refers to
the fact that the work is not based on a pre-existing work. Consequently, the latter “original” refers
to “primary” works – listed in Art. 2(1) BC – and has to be read in juxtaposition to “derivative”
works that are based on pre-existing ones.108
When  the  transformation,  adaptation  or  alteration  is  sufficiently  original  as  to  constitute  an
“intellectual creation” in its own right, the protection afforded to derivative works is assimilated to
that  afforded to  original  works  by  Art.  2(1)  BC. Nevertheless,  this  is  without  prejudice  to  the
copyright in the pre-existing work. Therefore, the authorisation of the right holder is necessary to
avoid liability for copyright infringement, unless the use is covered by a specific exemption or the
pre-existing work has fallen into the public domain. If the derivative work is created in absence of
authorization or outside the cases admitted by law, and constitutes therefore an unauthorized use, it
105  See Ricketson & Ginsburg, 2006, at 8.75.
106  Art. 10 of the text discussed at the Diplomatic Conference of 1884 treated musical compositions as a form of infringement. The
modern wording of art 2(3) can be traced back to the text approved during the Berlin Act of 1905; See Ricketson & Ginsburg,
2006, at 8.77.
107  See Art. 2(3) BC.
108  Id.
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generally  still  attracts  protection.109 The  U.S.,  however,  have  a  specific  provision  whereby  a
derivative work unlawfully created does not benefit from copyright.110
Evidently,  not  every  case  of  creation  of  a  work  based  on  another  work  constitutes  an  act  of
adaptation or alteration requiring authorization. In order to constitute a derivative work the elements
constituting the intellectual creation in a primary work need to be reproduced, adapted or altered in
the secondary work. Consequently, if a work is only inspired by the idea expressed in a previous
work, there is simply no act of derivation and accordingly no authorization is required. In these
cases, the resulting work, if an intellectual creation in its own right,  is protected as an original
(primary) work.  
Three cases of derivative works are specifically regulated by the Berne Convention: translations,
arrangements of music, and adaptations and other alterations.
Translations  commonly  refer  to  changing  a  literary  or  dramatic  work  from one  language  into
another.111 Whether the term language includes only “traditional” human languages, or, on the other
hand,  includes  also  modern  forms  of  “artificial”  languages  such  as  computer  programming
languages is ultimately a matter to be decided by domestic law, but in principle not incompatible
with Berne's broad definition.112
Arrangements of music generally involve skills such as adaptation and transcription of a musical
part for one instrument into that for another, or the addition of rhythmic parts to a melody.113
The third category, adaptations and other alterations, constitutes a residual class whose scope is to
cover  all  the  elaborations  “considered  to  fall  within  the  scope  of  adaptation”  such  as
“dramatizations and choreographic or mime adaptations, the making of prose versions of dramatic
works, the rendition of a literary or dramatic work into a dramatic-musical form and so on”.114
These  open  ended  definitions,  however,  encounter  a  precise  limit.  Only  the  adaptations  and
alterations  that  involve  new  authorial  contributions  can  benefit  from  the  assimilation  of  the
protection afforded to original works. Omissions or changes of small sections and the incorporation
of other material not accompanied by new original additions are not not included in the protection
as derivative works.115
Furthermore, it must be noted that translations, adaptations and other alterations not only constitute
protectable subject matter in their own right as established by Art. 2(3). The Convention explicitly
recognises to authors of literary or artistic works the enjoyment of the exclusive right of authorizing
adaptations, arrangements and other alterations of their works (Art. 12) and that authors of literary
and  artistic  works  shall  enjoy  the  making  and  authorising  of  the  translation  of  their  works
throughout the term of protection of the original works (Art. 8). Moreover, authors of dramatic,
dramatic-musical and literary works enjoy, during the full term of their rights in the original works,
the rights of authorizing the public performance/recitation and communication to the public of the
translations of their works (Art. 11-2 and 11ter-2).
109  Goldstein & Hugenholtz, 2013, at 6.1.2.7.
110  See U.S. Copyright Act 1976 Sec. 103(a).
111  Ricketson & Ginsburg, 2010, at 8.78. Goldstein & Hugenholtz, 2013, at 6.1.2.7.
112  Id.
113  Id., at 8.79.
114  Id., at 8.81; Masouyé C., 1978, at 76-7.
115  Goldstein & Hugenholtz, 2013, at 8.81.
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Finally,  authors  of  literary  or  artistic  works  have  the  exclusive  right  of  authorizing  the
cinematographic  adaptation  and  reproduction  of  their  works,  and  the  distribution,  public
performance  and  communication  to  the  public  of  the  works  so  adapted  or  reproduced.  The
adaptation into any other artistic form of a cinematographic production derived from literary or
artistic works shall, without prejudice to the right in the cinematographic production, remain subject
to the authorization of the authors of the original works (Art. 14).
 
3.2 The European Acquis Communautaire
As seen above, many of the EU directives in the field of copyright regulate rights of economic
exploitation such as the reproduction right, the distribution right and the right of communication to
the public. Traditionally, this was done through a “vertical” approach such as in the case of the
Software and Database directives. The Infosoc Directive took for the first time a broad horizontal
approach and offered  a  generous definition  of  the right  of  reproduction,  communication  to  the
public and distribution.
However, the adaptation  right  has  usually  remained untouched by these vertical  and horizontal
harmonising interventions. Unique exceptions to this lack of regulation are found in the Software
and in the Database Directives where both adaptations and translations are explicitly mentioned.116
3.2.1 The Software and Database Directives
Recital 15 of the Software Directive states that translations, adaptations or transformations of the
form of the computer program code constitute an infringement of the exclusive rights of the author,
unless these acts are necessary to achieve interoperability. Preparatory design materials  are also
protected, since all subsequent programming steps can be considered adaptations of the preceding
stages.117 Furthermore, Art. 4(b) states that the rights vested in the author of a computer program
include the translation, adaptation, arrangement and any other alteration of a computer program,
subject to the exceptions listed in Arts. 5 and 6.118
Regarding the Database Directive,  Art.  5(b) establishes  that  in respect  of the expression of the
database which is protectable by copyright, the author has the exclusive right to translate, adapt,
arrange and perform any other alteration. It must be noted that Art. 5 deals with copyright protection
and therefore translations and adaptations refer to the selection or arrangement of the database and
not  to the data.  It  has been stated that  the translation  of the structure of a database is  “hardly
imaginable”.119
116  See Art. 4(1)(b) Software Directive and Art. 5(b) Database Directive.
117  Walter & von Lewinski, 2010, at 5.1.39
118  See Recital 15 and Art. 4 of the Software Directive; Walter & von Lewinski, 2010, at 5.1.39; Samuelson, Vinje & Cornish,
2012.
119  See Walter & von Lewinski, 2010, at 9.5.9.
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It  follows  that,  from a  EU perspective  –  and  with  the  exception  of  software  and  databases  –
translations, adaptations and transformations of works into new expressive forms are left to MS
discretion.  The  reasons  for  such  a  gap  in  the  full  harmonization  of  the  rights  of  economic
exploitation can be attributed to the “borderline” nature of the right of adaptation. The adaptation of
a work often requires its, at least partial, reproduction. Yet, there is more: as seen above, a simple
reproduction  of  a  work accompanied  by small  non-creative  modifications,  does not lead to  the
creation  of  a  derivative.  A derivative  work  requires  an  authorial  original  contribution  of  the
intervening author; however, until recently the concept of originality was not harmonised. Hence, a
proper harmonization of the adaptation right without simultaneously harmonising the threshold of
originality could have caused unpredictable consequences.120
3.2.2 Adaptations and integrity
Moreover, derivative works and the economic right of authorising adaptations and modifications are
intimately connected with the moral right of integrity. Moral rights, similarly to the concept  of
originality until 2009, are not object of harmonisation in EU law. As usual, a common reference can
be found in Art. 6-bis of the Berne Convention which establishes that authors shall have the right to
claim authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or
other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to their honour or
reputation.121 These rights are independent from the economic rights, shall remain with the author
even after the transfer of the rights of economic exploitation and shall be maintained at least until
the expiry of the economic rights.122 At the MS level additional moral rights may be recognised.
Usually, the  right  of  disclosure,  the  right  of  retract  (or  withdraw)  and  the  right  of  access  are
commonly found in EU Member States.123
Of particular relevance for the present purpose is the second right recognised by the Art. 6-bis(1),
also  known as  the  right  of  integrity. The  strong connection  between  the  (economic)  right  that
regulates the creation of adaptations and creative elaborations and the (moral) right that protects the
integrity of the work is clear, as it is clear the potential conflict caused by the transferable nature of
the former and the non transferable nature of the latter.124
In conclusion, it can be said that the absence of a harmonised right of adaptation was well justified
by the concomitant absence of harmonisation of the originality requirement and of moral rights, in
particular of the right of integrity. Such an absence was partially compensated by a broadly defined
– and harmonised – right of reproduction. Whereas the latter does not explicitly include a right of
adaptation, it must be also noted that at the MS level some Copyright Acts systematically classify
the right of adaptation as a form of reproduction.125
120  See van Eechoud, Hugenholtz, van Gompel, Guibault, Helberger, 2012, at 84.
121  See in general Goldstein 1983. The honour and reputation requirement is set in the Berne Convention. Some MS state however
do not explicitly include the harm to the honour and reputation as a requirement; see  Salokannel & Strowel, 2000, at 16.
122  See Art. 6-bis Berne Convention.
123  See Salokannel & Strowel, 2000.
124  Moral rights are usually non transferrable but they can be waived in many jurisdictions.
125  See van Eechoud, Hugenholtz, van Gompel, Guibault, Helberger, 2012, at 84.
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3.2.3 The Court of Justice and the European Commission on the right
of adaptation
As seen  above,  starting  in  2009  the  first  of  these  two  justifications  started  to  fade  away  and
currently it can be affirmed that the concept of originality is completely harmonised at the EU level.
The same, however, does not hold true for moral rights. As the ECJ has recently confirmed, moral
rights are a matter of MS law (as clearly stated in i.a. Recital 19 of the Infosoc Directive)  and must
be exercised in compliance with the provisions of the Berne Convention, the WCT and the WPPT.126
Nevertheless, by stressing the importance of the function of parody under EU law and in particular
its relationship with the right of freedom of expression, the Court seemed to imply that there are EU
related limits to moral rights protection.127
Whether  these two recent  events  point  to  the  fact  that  the right  of  adaptation  will  soon be,  or
perhaps has already been at least in part, harmonised is not clear. The best opinion, in absence of an
explicit legislative intervention is that the right of adaptation has to date not been object of EU
harmonisation.128
Nevertheless, the European Commission appears to have recently expressed a different view. In an
unofficial draft document, and therefore with all the cautions due in similar cases in relation to the
correctness of the view therein expressed, the EC purports the idea that the adaptation right might in
fact have been object of EU harmonisation.129 Discussing the issue of User Generated Content, the
EC recognised that “contrary to the reproduction right and communication to the public/making
available right, there is no express rule with respect to adaptations in the Infosoc Directive”. The
Document continues and opines that “the broad manner in which the reproduction right in Art. 2 is
formulated and the CJEU's  jurisprudence on the scope of the reproduction right notably in Infopaq
and Eva-Maria Painer seem to cover adaptations which give rise to a further reproduction within
the meaning of Art. 2”.130
Opportunely, the  EC leaves  the door  open to  possible  different  interpretations,  making explicit
reference to the aforementioned case – at the time of the leaked document – pending before the
ECJ, which has now been decided (as of January 2015).131 All the same, it should be also noted that
the EC intervened in that case and supported the broad interpretation of the right of reproduction.132
126  See Opinion of the AG Pedro Cruz Villalón of 22 May 2014 in Case C-201/13 (Deckmyn v Vandersteen), at 4 and 28.
127  In the following decision (Case C-201/13) the ECJ offered its interpretation of what constitutes a parody under EU law stressing
the strict relation it possesses with the fundamental right of freedom of expression and identifying the multiple implications of
the use of modified version of a work for transformative purposes such as parody. The Court, or more correctly the AG, also
clarified that the decision could not address the issue of moral rights. At the national level, see for example the decision of the
Brussels Court of Appeal of 8 June 1978 (Tin-Tin and Suisse, rejecting the parody  defence), cited in Salokannel & Strowel,
2000; Court of Appeal of Amsterdam of 13 September 2011 BS 7825 in favour of parody for the use of Nijntje).
128  Only the AG opinion expressly dealt with the issue of moral rights, the Court did not mention them in its decision.
129  The document is the Commission’s draft Impact Assessment on the modernisation of the EU acquis made originally available
on  the Statewatch website.  The  specialised  IP  blog  “The  IPKat”  gives  a  detailed  account  here
http  ://  ipkitten  . blogspot  . co  . uk  /2014/04/  breaking  - news  - draft  - impact  - assessment  . html.
130  See draft Impact Assessment, at 99.
131  Id.
132  See infra fn 131.
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a) Allposter v Stichting Pictoright
The recently decided case is Allposter v Stichting Pictoright a reference from the Dutch Supreme
Court (Hoge Raad) examining the transfer of images of paintings from posters to canvas. The Hoge
Raad referred four questions to the ECJ. It asked: 1) to define the scope of Art. 4 Infosoc directive
(i.e. distribution right) and whether it includes a right to distribute modified copies; 2a) whether the
fact that the redistribution happens in modified form has any consequence on Art. 4(2) regulating
the exhaustion of the right of distribution; 2b) which type of modifications can avoid the exhaustion
of the distribution right; and finally 2c) whether a national rule, such as the Dutch, which excludes
exhaustion  when the reseller  modifies  the work and then distributes  it  (Poortvleet doctrine),  is
allowed under EU law.133 Or, as the AG Cruz Villalón summarised in its Opinion “Can the right
holder  of a pictorial  work,  who authorised the sale of posters based on that  work,  prevent  the
commercialisation  of  the  same  images  transferred  on  canvas”?134 The  ECJ  borrowed  the  AG
reformulation of the referred questions and re-proposed it in a slightly more articulated form.135
As the AG clarifies in pars. 51 – 53, the question asked by the referring Court is limited to the right
of distribution and does not consider the right of reproduction. Consequently – the AG continues –
even though the question could be relevant in terms of the right of reproduction (and its relationship
with the right of adaptation) his opinion will disregard that right and only focuses on the right of
distribution.  This is  at  the same time comprehensible  and disappointing,  since one of the most
interesting questions related to the case and elaborated to some extent by the intervening parties (the
French Government, the British Government and the EC) could have been avoided.
The Court, however, apparently realised the logical impossibility to solve the referred questions
without addressing, at least in part, the issue of the adaptation right and its relation to the right of
reproduction. Accordingly, the Court confirmed that Article 12 of the Berne Convention confers on
authors of literary and artistic works an exclusive right of authorising adaptations, arrangements and
other alterations of their works and that there is no equivalent right in the Infosoc Directive.136
Nevertheless, the Court held that – without having to interpret the concept of “adaptation” within
the meaning of Berne, an exercise found in the AG Opinion – it suffices to state that both the paper
poster and the canvas transfer contain the image of a protected artistic work and thus fall within the
scope of the right of reproduction (Art. 4 Infosoc).137
That being said, it is noteworthy for present purposes to briefly look at the qualification of the right
of adaptation present in the words of the AG in the remainder of its Opinion:
“... one of the essential elements of “adaptation” as a process of adjustment of the
subject  matter  of  an  artistic  creation  to  the  methods  of  expression  peculiar  to
different  types  of  art  lies  in  the  diversity  of  languages  and  artistic  techniques.
Another of  its  essential  elements concerns adaptation as a technique of  creative
expression which seeks to intervene in the work itself rather than to adjust the work
133  See Case C-419/13, of 22 January 2015 Art & Allposters International BV v Stichting Pictoright,  (Allposters).
134  See Opinion of the Advocate General Pedro Cruz Villalón of 11 September 2014 in Case C-419/13 Allposters.
135  “... the questions referred, which should be considered together, must be understood to mean that the referring court is asking, in
essence, whether the rule of exhaustion of the distribution right set out in Article  4(2) of Directive 2001/29 applies in a situation
where a reproduction of a protected work,  after having been marketed in the European Union with the copyright holder’s
consent, has undergone an alteration of its medium, such as the transfer of that reproduction from a paper poster onto a canvas,
and is placed on the market again in its new form”, See  Case C-419/13 (Allposters), at 23.
136  Id., at 26.
137 Id., at 27 – 28.
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to the expressive characteristics of another artistic language, making the work, in
its own language, a different work in so far as it is only vaguely recognisable in its
original expression”138
On the basis of this formulation of the adaptation right the AG concludes that the facts at issue in
the main proceedings do not constitute an adaptation, since there is no different artistic language nor
there are additions or modifications to the creative expression. In the present case – the AG states –
the objective of the elaboration is to reach the highest possible grade of identity with the original.139
The Court, avoiding to enter into an analysis of the right of adaptation, substantially followed the
AG Opinion on this point. In particular, with regard to the transfer of the image from poster to
canvas, the Court noted that such a replacement of the medium results in the creation of a new
object incorporating the image of the protected work, whereas the poster itself ceases to exist.140
Such an alteration of the copy of the protected work, which provides a result closer to the original,
is actually sufficient to constitute a new reproduction of that work, within the meaning of Article
2(a) Infosoc, which is covered by the exclusive right of the author and requires his authorisation.141
Crucially, the Court rejects the Allposters's argument that no act of reproduction is performed, since
there is no multiplication of copies of the protected work (the transfer of the ink from the poster to
the canvas not only reproduces the image on the new medium, but erases it from the old one).142
“The fact that the ink is saved during the transfer cannot affect the finding that
the image’s medium has been altered. What is important is whether the altered
object itself, taken as a whole, is, physically, the object that was placed onto the
market with the consent of the right-holder. That does not appear to be the case
in the dispute in the main proceedings”143
Consequently, the Court  concludes  that  the consent  of the copyright  holder  does not  cover  the
distribution  of  an  object  incorporating  his  work  if  that  object  has  been  altered  after  its  initial
marketing in such a way that it constitutes a new reproduction of that work.144
3.3 Some final considerations on the right of adaptation
The  Court  clearly  established  that,  differently  from the  right  of  reproduction  and  the  right  of
distribution, the right of adaptation is not present in the European aquis.145 The Court, however, also
stated that certain kind of alterations, such as the one at stake in the main proceedings, are covered
by the harmonised right of reproduction.146 The question that the Court did not address is how to
138   See AG Opinion in Case C-419/13, at 58.
139  Id., at 59
140  The Court notes that such a technique “increases the durability of the reproduction,  improves the quality of the image in
comparison with the poster and provides a result closer to the original of the work” an expression that seems to imply that the
modified work is directed to a new public; See Case C-419/13, at 42.
141  See Case C-419/13, at 43.
142  Id., at 44 and 45.
143  Id.
144  Id., at 46.
145  Id., at 26.
146  Id., at 43.
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distinguish  between  non  harmonised adaptations  and  alterations  included  in  the  right  of
reproduction.
In accordance to previous ECJ case law, a reproduction, in order to be covered by Art. 2 of the
Infosoc directive – i.e. reproduction by any means and in any form, in whole or in part – needs to
reproduce the author's own intellectual creation. The ECJ clearly stated that even a small or short
reproduction – such as 11 words – can constitute an infringement of the reproduction right provided
that the short reproduced strings constitute the author's own intellectual creation.147 The facts under
analysis in Allposter related to a perfect reproduction of the original image onto the new medium,
and therefore the reproduction certainly included the author's own intellectual creation present in
the original.
Consequently the question is: Does the same infringement test apply also to the right of adaptation?
Admittedly, a mere extension of the Infopaq infringement test to the right of adaptation will lead to
the assimilation of the latter into the already broadly defined right of reproduction. Nonetheless, a
similar course of action would deny the idiosyncrasy of a right to create derivative works. This
speciality resides in the fundamentally different normative function carried out by the right to create
adaptations. This function is to delimit the boundaries between infringing activities and permitted
uses  and  basically  defines  the  scope of  copyright  in  modern  legal  systems.148 In  particular,  in
knowledge-based and digitally enhanced societies this function is fundamentally connected to the
role that  transformative uses possess.  More and more,  the creation of new forms of expression
employing  existing  works  –  very  often  to  an  extent  that  certainly  satisfies  the Infopaq test  –
constitutes  a  central  element  of  new  social  and  economic  practices,  particularly  in  on-line
environments.  This  can  be  seen,  for  instance,  in  phenomena  such  as  User  Generated  Content
(UGC),  Text  and  Data  Mining  (TDM),  and  the  digitisation  of  cultural  heritage.  The  more
transformative a work is, the less likely a finding of infringement should be, irrespective of how
much of the original author's own intellectual creation has been taken.
Conversely,  a  rigid  test  that  only  looks  at  the  amount  taken,  therefore  reducing  the  right  of
adaptation to a particular form of reproduction, would deny the added cultural, social and economic
value that the concept of transformative uses embraces. Likewise, such a rigid test would also stifle
transformative uses that constitute manifestations of the freedom of expression (e.g. chilling effect)
of transformative users.  
In conclusion, a flexible test the compares the amount reproduced with the added creative elements
and evaluates how distant is the final transformative use from the original work would certainly
strike a fair balance between creativity, innovation and freedom of expression.149 Furthermore, it
must be reiterated that if it is accepted that the concept of adaptation is ontologically different from
that of reproduction, as it is here suggested, then a broad exception for the case of transformative
works, that is to say an exception to the right of adaptation, would not be limited by the closed list
of art. 5 Infosoc.150
147  See Infopaq, at 39.
148  In this sense Gervais, 2013.
149  The U.S. fair use doctrine is certainly an inspiring model.
150  See van Eechoud & all, 2012, 84; Hugenholtz & Senftleben, 2011. In the same sense a Gervais, 2013. See also the Report
prepared  by  the  Irish  Copyright  Review  Committee,  Modernising  Copyright,  Dublin  2013,  at  55  and  72  (available  at
http  ://  www  . enterprise  . gov  . ie  / en  / News  /2013/  October  /-  Copyright  - report  - published  - aimed  - at  - supporting  - digital  - industry  -
%  E  2%80%93-  Minister  - Bruton  . html
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4. Photographic works and non original photographs
This part briefly outlines the international and EU protection afforded to photographic works. The
protection  offered by EU law to photographs,  at  least  in terms of originality, has already been
discussed supra in the chapter dedicated to “originality” and will therefore not be repeated. Some
elements  connected  with  the  ECJ  analysis  of  the  protection  of  photographs  (i.e.  Painer)  are
concisely  presented.  Additional  elements  of  analysis  regarding  the  implementation  of  EU
legislation, the special case of “other photographs” and MS case law are present below in part II.
4.1 The international landscape
When photography was invented at the beginning of the 19th century, it was seen as a mechanical
process where the opportunity to express one's creativity was denied by an extremely rudimentary
(for today's eyes) technique.151 During the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth,
however, photography became more sophisticated and allowed operators to regulate and modify a
number of parameter in order to obtain better results. These possibilities, that is to say, the choices
that photographers could make in order to obtain the desired results came to be seen as creative and
therefore  the  idea  that  photography  could  be  conceived  as  a  form of  art  deserving  copyright
protection began to spread.152
Photographic works have been included in the enumeration of works of Art.  2(1) of the Berne
Convention only in the Brussels revision of 1948, yet they were recognised as copyright subject
matter  in  many  countries  since  much  longer.  Other  countries,  however,  refused  to  recognise
creativity  to  acts  that  were deemed to  involve  technical  skills  rather  than  creativity.153 As it  is
reported by Ricketson, the tension between these two opposed approaches lead to the approval of a
declaration in the Closing Protocol to the original Berne Act of the Convention of 1886:
As regards Article 4, it is agreed that those countries of the Union where the character
for artistic works is not refused to photographs engage to admit them to the benefits of
the  Convention  concluded today, from the  date  of  its  coming into  force.  They  shall,
however, not be bound to protect the authors of such works further than is permitted by
their own legislation … It is understood that an authorised photograph of a protected
work of art shall enjoy legal protection in all countries of the Union, as contemplated by
the Convention for the same period as the principal right of reproduction of the work
itself subsists, and within the limits of private agreements between those who have legal
rights.
Accordingly, as per the first version of the Berne Convention, the only photographs required to be
protected by Union Members were authorised photographs of protected works of art. Regarding all
151  The  earliest  still  surveying  camera  photograph,  View  from  the  Window  at  Le  Gras,  dates  back  to  1826;  See
https  ://  en  . wikipedia  . org  / wiki  / View  _  from  _  the  _  Window  _  at  _  Le  _  Gras
152  See Bently & Sherman, 2014, at 95; Bettink,1989, at 37; Deazley, 2010, at 293; Garnett, 2000; Gendreau, Nordemann & Oesch,
1999; Hughes, 2011-2012.
153  To the first  category of countries belong France and the UK, while to the second Germany; See Ricketson,  International
Conventions, in Gendrau, Nordemann, & Oesch, 1999, at 18.
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other photographs, protection was left to the discretion of those Berne Countries which deemed
photographs to be artistic works.154
The  uniform  recognition  of  photographic  works  and  of  their  protection  grew  among  Berne
Countries as it  can be read in the different revisions of the Convention.  By 1908 photographic
works and works obtained by an analogous process were recognised as a protected subject matter,
even though they were not considered as literary and artistic works and there was no reference to
the duration of the protection.155
As said, it was not until the Brussels revision of 1948 that photographs were recognised as a form of
artistic work and were included in the list of Art. 2 generally protecting literary and artistic works.
Yet, the full assimilation of photographs to other works of authorship never achieved its completion
in Berne, at least in relation to the term of protection. Since the Stockholm revision of 1967 it was
established a minimum of 25 years from the making of the photograph, a term that has not been
modified in the text of the Berne Convention until today.156
Nevertheless, as it is well known, the term of protection of photographs for signatories of the WIPO
Copyright Treaty of 1996 (which is considered as a special agreement within the meaning Art. 20 of
the Berne Convention), is substituted with that of Art. 7(1) Berne Convention, that is to say, 50
years post mortem auctoris.157 For EU Member States, the Copyright Term Directive has extended
the  general  term  of  protection  for  photographic  works  (i.e.  those  that  are  the  author's  own
intellectual creation) to 70 years.158
The obligations  established by Berne refer  to  photographic works,  that  is  to  say to  intellectual
creation  expressed  through  photography  or  a  process  assimilated  to  it.  As  seen,  the  specific
determination  of  the  level  of  originality  required  is  left  to  the  discretion  of  the  Berne  Union
members. The Berne convention itself, only requires the protection of photographic works, and does
not  regulate  the  protection  that  countries  can  afford  to  other  types  of  photographs  by  way of
neighbouring rights.159
4.2 The European landscape
As seen in chapter 2, discussing the level of originality in EU law, the Term Directive established
that photographs which are original in the sense that they are the author's own intellectual creation
reflecting his personality shall be protected by copyright and that no other criteria such as merit or
purpose shall be taken into account to determine their eligibility for protection.160
In Painer the ECJ elaborated further the concept of author's own intellectual creation in relation to
photographic works, and especially to portraits. The Court established that the photographer can
make  free  and  creative  choices  in  several  ways  and  at  various  points  in  the  creation  of  a
154  See Ricketson in Gendrau et all, at 19.
155  Id., at 22.
156  See Art. 7(4) Berne Convention.
157  See Art. 9 WIPO Copyright Treaty.
158  Regarding the harmonisation of the term of protection of copyright in the EU see generally Angelopoulos 2012.
159  See Ricketson in Gendrau et al, at 25.
160  See Recital 16 and Art. 6 Directive 2006/116/EC (codified version).
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photographic work.161 The first  identified moment is in the preparation phase, during which the
photographer can choose the background, the subject’s pose and the lighting.162 Secondly, when
taking a photograph, he can choose the framing, the angle of view and the atmosphere created.163
Thirdly, when selecting the snapshot, the photographer may choose from a variety of developing
techniques the one he wishes to adopt or, where appropriate, use computer software.164 By making
those various choices, the author of a (portrait) photograph can stamp the work created with his
“personal touch”.165
On this basis, the Court concludes that a specific type of photograph, a portrait photograph, cannot
be excluded from protection by the sole fact that the choices available are too limited when the
photographed object or subject are predetermined.  Nevertheless, it  will  be a matter  for national
courts to determine whether any specific picture possess the author's personal stamp.
Not only photographs are recognised as protectable subject matter by the Term Directive. As seen,
the last part of Art. 6 allows MS to afford protection to “other photographs”. In general terms, the
protection that some MS recognise to “other photographs” is defined negatively, that is to say by
offering protection to photographs that do not qualify as works of photography. European countries
recognising this form of protection (7 EU members plus 2 EEA members166) usually accord rights
similar to that of regular copyright (however there are significant exceptions) for a period of time
that is considerably shorter. The term of protection is probably the most inhomogeneous aspect
across countries and varies from 15 to 50 years from production or publication.167 Regarding the
subjective  element,  i.e.  what  type  of  human  input  is  requested,  it  is  certainly  below the  now
harmonised  level  of  originality  (the  author's  own  intellectual  creation).  Yet,  there  need  to  be
“something”,  a  minimum  element  of  craftsmanship,  intellectual  input  or  photographic  activity
involved.  This  minimum  amount  is  necessary  to  “draw  the  line  of  demarcation  between
photography on the one hand and mere copying on the other” and is left to the discretion of MS.168
In  conclusion,  the  Copyright  Term  Directive  established  two  main  principles  in  relation  to
photography:  it  harmonised the originality  standard for photographic works and allowed MS to
grant protection to “other” photographs. In part II it will be analysed how this double system of
protection, where present, operates.
161  See Painer, at 90.
162  Id., at 91.
163  Id.
164  Id.
165  Id., at 92. See for a comparison the U.S. Supreme Court case Burrow-Giles Lithographic v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884).
166  Germany, Spain, Italy, Austria, Denmark, Finland, and Sweden, plus Iceland and Norway; see infra Table n. 2.
167  Norway however requires 15 years p.m.a., but at least 50 years from creation.
168  See Walter M., in Gendreau et al, 1999.
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Part II – Country Overview
5. Germany
5.1 Originality
The German Copyright Act (UrhG)169 protects literary, scientific and artistic works, among which it
illustratively  lists  writings,  speeches,  musical  works,  works  of  fine  art,  works  of  photography,
cinematographic  works,  and  illustrations  of  a  scientific  or  technical  nature.170 The  list  is  non-
exhaustive and is followed by a general clause which defines copyright-protectable as all works that
are “personal intellectual creations”.171
In order to establish that  a work is  a personal  intellectual  creation four cumulative criteria  are
usually considered. According to these criteria a work is a “personal creation” (the work has to
originate from a person) with an “intellectual content” (an idea that is expressed) in a “perceptible
form” (the work need to be expressed in a form that can be perceived) which has a certain degree of
“individuality” (the work has specific characteristics that make it original).172 This does not mean
that works need to be novel or unique, but they need to be creative and individual to the author.173
Consequently, mere  ideas  are  not  protected  and they  need to  be  expressed  or  formalized  in  a
specific  form in order to enjoy protection.174 However, fixation is  not a requirement  and “live”
works such as live television shows and live artistic performances find protection under German
copyright  law.175 The  requirement  of  a  formal  expressive  elaboration,  however,  should  not  be
interpreted as a particularly high standard of originality, as confirmed, for instance, by the fact that
trivial/minor  literary  works  are  usually  protectable  (“small  change”  or kleine  Münze).176
Accordingly,  catalogues,  address  books,  single  sentences  and  operating  instructions  have  been
found sufficiently original to deserve protection.177  
5.2 Derivative works
169  German Copyright Act, Act of 9 September 1965 “Gesetz über Urheberrecht und verwandte Schutzrechte”, UrhG.
170  See Arts. 1 and 2 German Copyright Act.
171  See Fromm & Nordemann, 2008, at Sec. 2, para. 11.
172  See Dietz, Substantive Criteria, in Geller & Bently, 2013, at 2[1][b]. Handig, 2013, at 336. Nordemann, in Gendrau, Nordemann
& Oesch, 1999, at 137.
173  Id.
174  See Dietz, Substantive Criteria, in Geller & Bently, 2013, at 2[1][b]. Handig, 2013, at 336., at 2[1][b].
175  See Case I-20 U 171/10 (Court of Appeal Dusseldorf) of 30.12.2011, in GRUR 2012, 173 (considering protectable a live art
performance; amended, but not on this aspect by Case I ZR 28/12 (German Supreme Court, BGH) of 16.5.2013, in GRUR 2014,
65).
176  See Schricker, 1995, at 41.
177  See Dietz, Substantive Criteria, in Geller & Bently, 2013, at 2[1][b]. Handig, 2013, at 336., at 2[1][b]; See Case No. I ZR
147/89 (German Supreme Court, BGH) of 10.10.1991, in IIC 1992, 846.
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Derivative works are protected by Art. 3 of German Copyright Act as long as they constitute a
personal  intellectual  creation  of  the  adaptor.178 Art.  3  specifically  refers  to  translations
(Übersetzungen)179 and other adaptations (andere Bearbeitungen), but it includes also other types of
elaborations  such  as  dramatizations,  orchestrations,  and  new  versions  of  works.180 However,
insubstantial  adaptations  of unprotected musical works do not constitute  protectable  adaptations
similarly to any other unoriginal contributions.181
In order to establish whether an adaptation infringes an original work the features that determine the
original character of the primary work are decisive inasmuch as they determine the extent of the
scope of protection.182 This seems to imply that works with a lower, but still  sufficient, level of
originality are less likely to be infringed as the scope of protection is allegedly narrower.183 Older
authorities, though, propose a reading that requires the same level of originality for any derivative
work, regardless on how original the primary work is.184
Art. 23 of the German Copyright Act establishes that adaptations or other transformations of a work
may be published or exploited only with the consent of the author of the adapted or transformed
work. Therefore, in cases such as cinematographic adaptations of novels, or translations of articles
from one language into another, the original author's consent is required.
Nevertheless, German law explicitly provides for “free uses” of works in cases of adaptation. Art.
24 states  that  an independent  work created  by free use of the work of  another  person may be
published and exploited without the consent of the author of the used work.185  Free use can be
assumed if the adaptor only borrows minor parts of the original copyright protected work. What
counts,  in this  sense,  is  the difference that the secondary work shows in relation to the unique
features – the personal intellectual creation – of the adapted work.186 A “fair use” therefore requires
that “the peculiar features borrowed from the protected pre-existing work fade into the background
in the new work in such a manner that the new work no longer utilizes the pre-existing work to a
relevant extent, with the result that the latter appears as nothing more than a stimulus toward the
creation of a new, independent work”.187
178  See Art. 3 UrhG.
179  See Case I ZR 57/97 of the German Federal Supreme Court (BGH) of 15.09.1999 [Comic-Übersetzungen II] (establishing that
also translations of “simple dialogues”, such as in the case of comics, are protected as they constitute the authors' personal
intellectual creations).
180  See Dietz., Derivative works, new versions and compilations, in Geller & Bently, 2013, at 2[3][a].
181  See Art. 3 UhrG.
182  See Decision Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) of July 8, 2004 - Case No. I ZR 25/02 “Dog Character” (Hundefigur).
183  Id.
184  See BGH 03.11.1967 Ib ZR 123/65 "Haselnuß", in GRUR 1968, 321.
185  This does not apply to the use of a musical work where a melody has been recognizably borrowed from the work and used as a
basis for a new work, see Art. 24 UhrG.
186  See Case I ZR 264/91 (BGH) of 11.03.1993 [Asterix-Persiflagen] in IIC 1994, 610 [The Federal Supreme Court however also
points out that “Nevertheless, fair use is not only to be assumed where the peculiar features borrowed from a protected,  pre-
existing work fade in the new work in a more literal sense and accordingly recede therein in such a way that, in the newer work,
the pre-existing work only shimmers through weakly and in a manner that is no longer relevant in terms of copyright law. If fair
use were only possible in this manner, then any artistic use of still-protected works - whether in the form of a parody or any
other form - would be too narrowly restricted”].
187  Id.
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5.3 Photographic works and non original photographs
German law offers protection to original photographs as photographic works under the provision of
Art.  2.  It  follows  that  in  order  to  be  considered  a  work  of  photography  photographs  need  to
constitute a personal intellectual creation of their author, a requirement that seems in line with the
EU mandated standard.188
Furthermore, German law offers protection to non original photographs, a category that includes
products manufactured employing techniques  similar to photography. These photographs do not
reach the personal intellectual creation standard of Art. 2, yet they are protected by the the German
Copyright Act in an almost equivalent form, that is to say, by extending – as long as compatible –
the provisions protecting original photographs.189 Consequently, it is observable an almost perfect
assimilation of protection of the non original photographs of Art. 72 to the photographic works of
Art. 2.190 The main difference relates to the term of protection as the duration of the exclusive rights
for non original photographs is limited to 50 years after publication or production.191
A photograph is protected pursuant to Art. 72 in those cases when a very low original content is
present and therefore includes amateur photography, such as “point-and-shoot” pictures, where the
space for free and creative choices is almost absent.192 However, a minimum level of originality is
still necessary, although inevitably lower than that of Art. 2, and can be expressed, for example,
through  the  determination  of  the  shooting  conditions.193 Accordingly,  simple  photographs  are
protected as long as they possess a “minimum of personal intellectual input” as opposed to the
requirement of “personal intellectual creation” that Art. 2 demands for photographic works.194
In light of the aforementioned conditions, it seems plausible that a perfect digitisation of a text,
document, or image, realised by processes such as digital scanning or photocopying will most likely
fall outside the scope of protection of Art. 72 and constitute mere reproductions. This is certainly
the case for the mechanic digitisation of books as same the Supreme Court established.195
A different conclusion, however, could be reached when the digitised element is not a text or an
image, but a three-dimensional object. In the latter case, there will most likely be a human operator
who, in a process that can be assimilated to photography, will most probably place the item in the
best position in terms of light, angle, height and/or perspective in order to render in the picture as
many details  of  the object  as  possible.  In  such a  case,  while  the intent  of the  photographer  is
certainly that of reproducing the reality as closely as possible, therefore excluding any personal
stamp, the protection of simple photographs may be available inasmuch as the result reflects the
author's minimum intellectual input. This remains, nonetheless, a very contentious issue, and the
188  Dietz  suggests  that  the two standards,  the German “personal  intellectual  creation” and the EU “author's  own intellectual
creation”, are equivalent; See Dietz A., in Geller & Bently, 2[1][b].
189  See Art. 72(1) UhrG.
190  See Wiebe A., Schutz der Lichtbilder, in Spindler & Schuster, 2011.
191  See Art. 72(3) UhrG.
192  See Wiebe A., Schutz der Lichtbilder, in Spindler & Schuster, 2011.
193  Id.; See also Case I ZR 55/97 (German Federal Supreme Court, BGH), of  3. 11. 1999, in MMR 2000, 218.
194  See Case I ZR 55/97 (German Federal Supreme Court) of 3.11.1999 (Schutz von Lichtbildwerken), in MMR 2000, 218 (the
Court, relying on previous case law, employed the expression “ein Mindestmaß an persönlicher geistiger Leistung” as opposed
to the formula found in Art. 2 “persönliche geistige Schöpfungen”).
195  See in  this  sense Case I  ZR 14/88 (German Federal  Supreme Court,  BGH),  of  08.11.1989(erstellung und Vertrieb einer
Bibelreproduktion), in NJW-RR 1990, 1061 (excluding protection as simple photographs in case of mere duplication lacking any
minimum of personal intellectual input).
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fact that the result  of the digitisation process is a perfect reproduction of the three-dimensional
object should weigh against the possibility that the picture be protected by either Art. 2 or Art. 72
German Copyright Act.
6. France
6.1 Originality
In France copyright is regulated in the Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle (Intellectual Property
Code, IPC196). The object of copyright protection is a work of the mind (oeuvre de l'esprit) whatever
the kind, form of expression, merit or purpose.197 French law protects specific, individualized and
perfectly identifiable creations, not mere ideas.198 Protection is granted on the basis of the “seul fait
de sa création”199 and does not require any fixation.200
Included in the non exhaustive list of Art. 112-2 IPC are books, artistic and scientific writings,
cinematographic works and other works consisting of sequences of moving images, with or without
sound, works of drawing, painting, architecture, sculpture, photographic works and works produced
by techniques similar to photography.
French copyright law does not require that a specific work falls within one of the categories of
literary, musical, dramatic and artistic works, nor does it require that one of the types of protected
works is included in the non-exhaustive list of Art. L.112-1 be met.201
The concept of “originality” was systematically approached only relatively recently by the French
doctrine.202 Although the specific formulations employed by scholars and the courts may vary, the
generally accepted standard is that of the stamp of the author's personality or l'empreinte de la
personnalité de l'auteur.203
In order to verify whether the author's personality is present in the work, French courts usually
enquire whether he had the possibility to choose among a number of possible expressive forms, and
by choosing one instead of another, he expressed his personality.204 In other words, in order to
196  Code de la propriété intellectuelle created by Loi n° 92-597 of 1 July 1992, as amended.
197  See  Art. L.112-1 IPC.
198  See Lucas & Kamina; in Bently & Geller, at 2[1][b][ii].
199  See Lucas & Lucas, 2012, at 59.
200  See Art. L.111-1 IPC.
201  See Lucas & Kamina; in Bently & Geller, at 2[1][b][ii][C].
202  Lucas & Lucas, 2012, at 118.
203  See e.g.  Supreme Court (Cour de Cassation),  10 July 2013 n.  12-19170 [Sté Nereides];  24 June 2014, n.  13-12067 [Sté
Weston]; Court of Appeal of Paris, 11 sept. 2013, n. 11-22046, [Sté. Repetto];  Lucas & Lucas, at 119; Judge & Gervais, 2009, at
378 – 379.
204  See Supreme Court (Cour de Cassation) 13 May 2014, n. 12-27691 [Sté Xooloo]; Lucas & Lucas at 120; Gervais & Judge
2009,  at  380;  Employing  the  same expression  (“l’empreinte  de  personnalité  de  l’auteur”)  see Tribunal  d’Arrondissement
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establish  whether  the  threshold  of  the l'empreinte  de  la  personnalité is  achieved,  courts  verify
whether in the process of creation of the work enough creative choices have been made.205 This
formulation of the originality standard and of the related test seems in line with the latest ECJ case
law.206
6.2 Derivative works
Art.  L.112-3  IPC  establishes  that  the  authors  of  translations,  adaptations,  transformations  or
arrangements of works of the mind shall enjoy protection without prejudice to the rights of the
author of the original work.207 A translation or adaptation will be protected by copyright if it  is
original,  which  will  be  evaluated  on  the  basis  of  the  presence  of  the  translator's  or  adapter's
personality in the resulting derivative work.208
In a decision on musical works, the Court of Appeal of Paris stated that a musical arrangement is
original if the arranger added, modified or deleted certain parts of the primary work and in this way
he expressed his own personality in the derivative work.209 Regarding translations, courts ruled that
they are protected by copyright if “the author can express his creativity in an original manner and
achieve a result which is an intellectual creation”.210
Article L.113-2 paragraph 2 Intellectual Property Code defines a “composite work” as “a new work
in which a pre-existing work is incorporated without the collaboration of the primary author”. A
composite work therefore refers to simple incorporations (e.g. music synchronized in a film) and to
adaptations (e.g. a remake or an adaptation of a book into a film). A composite work is the property
of the author who has produced it, subject to the rights of the author of the pre-existing work.211
6.3 Photographs and non original photographs
Photographic works, which include works produced by techniques analogous to photography are
protected when they reach the required level of originality. Examples of creative choices that can
lead to the necessary level of originality in the creation of photographic works can be identified in
the  selection  of  shots,  in  the  adjustment  of  camera  angles  and  lighting,  or  in  the  staging  or
preparatory acts leading to the taking of the photograph.212
Diekirch (Luxemburg)  decision 169/2003, 8 August 2003, LJUS n° 99844360, reported by the Luxembourg correspondent.
205  Judge & Gervais, 2009, at 381.
206  See above part I.
207  See Art. L.112-3
208  See Lucas & Kamina; in Bently & Geller, at 2[3][a].
209  See Court of Appeal of Paris, of 17 Dec. 2010, 06/15843, in 69 Revue Lamy Droit de l’Immatériel, 2011 at 2266.
210  See Court of Appeal of Paris, 6 February 2002, 2001/17352.
211  See Article L.113-4 Intellectual Property Code.
212  See Lucas & Kamina, in Bently & Geller, at 2[2][b].
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French  copyright  law  does  not  afford  special  neighbouring  right  protection  to  non  original
photographs.213
Interestingly, the Court of Appeal of Paris held that a photograph of a work of art may be original
due to its own photographic features and therefore lead to an “oeuvre composite”.214 In this case, the
photographer, taking pictures of works of art during an exhibition, chose the moments of the click,
the type of illumination and the angles of the photograph, thereby demonstrating creativity and the
stamp of his personality. It must be noted, nonetheless, that in the referred case the work of art was
a moving object, an aspect that was central in the holding of the court which focused on the fact that
the photographer had to choose the right moment during the swinging of the object in order to
represent properly the work of art. This choice of time, light and angle was held not to constitute a
mere  application  of  technical  knowledge,  notwithstanding the  fact  that  in  the case  at  issue the
plaintiff  argued  to  have  given  specific  instruction  to  the  photographer  on  how  to  realise  the
pictures.215 Similarly, in another decision the Cour de Cassation found that a photographer put his
personal stamp on the photographic work by choosing the most opportune moments and ways to
realize the picture.216
Nevertheless, in order to find that a photograph deserves copyright protection, it is mandatory for
courts at trial to determine on a case by case basis whether the author stamped his creativity on the
work.217 Consequently, it has been ruled that a number of photographs of the city of Paris which
were automatically taken by a camera placed on an aircraft and where the “operator” could only
determine the moment of the shot, but not the angle, light and other parameters did not show the
personality of the author and consequently did not attract copyright protection.218 In this case, the
Court stressed that even though the pictures were realised with great skill (“elles sont le fruit du
travail d'un excellent technicien doté d'un équipement performant”) they lack an original character
and do not carry the stamp of the author's personality: The pictures would have looked the same if
taken by another technician placed in the same situation.219  Recently, the Supreme Court held that a
photograph was not protected as a work of authorship because “la photographie revendiquée ne
révélait,  dans  les  différents  éléments  qui  la  composent,  aucune  recherche  esthétique  et  qu'elle
constituait une simple prestation de services techniques ne traduisant qu'un savoir-faire”.220 While
the pursue of an aesthetic research seems not to be contemplated by the requirements set forth by
the Term Directive and further interpreted by the ECJ, especially in Infopaq and Painer,  it  can
certainly  be  inferred  from  such  rulings,  that  the  perception  that  French  courts  have  of  the
requirement of originality, particularly in photographs, is probably higher than what available in
other countries.221
213  For an account documenting a legislative initiative to introduce a form of protection for,  inter alia, non original photographs,
see Le Stanc, 1992.
214  See  Court of Appeal of Paris 5 May 2000, in RIDA 2001, n. 188, at 352; See Markellou, 2013.
215  “[...] la nature de l'éclairage et de l'angle de prise de vue adoptés pour faire ressortir au mieux les couleurs et les volumes de la
sculputre temoignent d'un choix personnel du photographe et portent l'empreinte de sa personalite”; See Court of Appeal of
Paris 5 May 2000, in RIDA 2001, n. 188, at 352, at 356.
216  See  French Supreme Court (Cour de Cassation) of 12 January 1994, n. 91-15718.
217  See Cour de Cassation of 14 November 2000, n. 98-18741.
218  See TGI Paris, 6 Oct. 2009, RIDA, 2010, no. 226, 506.
219  Id.,  at  508;  In a  similar  direction see Cour de Cassation 1  March 1988,  n.  86-12213,  denying protection for  shots  of  a
technician.
220  See Cour de Cassation, 20 October 2011, n. 10-21251.
221  Confront this standard with the one employed by the Patent County Court in Temple Island Collections Ltd v. New English Teas
Ltd, [2012] EWPCC 1, discussed below.
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Interestingly, it is reported that in 2010 a court of first instance excluded from protection a large
number of photographs of works of art for auction catalogues, as they lacked originality because
“the photographer was not asked to show any emotion, as it is the object for sale that must be put
forward (for the auctions) and not the personality of the author of the photograph”.222 The Court of
Appeal of Paris reversed this ruling, giving a different evaluation of the choices operated by the
photographer, in particular in relation to the positioning of the objects, the framing, the angles, the
use of the shadows and light and the creation of a background.223
In conclusion, it seems possible to exclude that acts of automatic digitisation of books and images
fall within the scope of protection of photographic works. This includes situations where a human
intervention is present, as long as the human contribution is that of a technician, that is to say where
there is no personality of the author because any other technician would have produced the same
result. The case of object of art is, as usual, borderline. Not every photograph of a three-dimensional
work of art will be protected, but only those photographic works that add the personality of the
author to the already existing work of art.  
7. Spain
7.1 Originality
The  Spanish  Copyright  Act  (TRLPI224)  affords  protection  in  general  to  “literary,  artistic  and
scientific works”225 which constitute “original creations”226 expressed in any manner or medium and
contains the usual non-exhaustive list of protected subject matter (“comprendiéndose entre ellas”);
fixation is not required.
In courts' interpretation the concept of originality has evolved over time and recent case law has
found originality  in  very simple creations,  such as notebooks for elementary  school use227 or  a
booklet  of  instructions  on  how to  install  and  use  a  shower  screen.228 Nevertheless,  a  “formal
expression” is essential and consequently not only ideas, but also methods, formulas, and “themes”
have been denied protection.229
222  See High Court of First Instance of Paris, 30 November 2010, No. 09/04437 cited in Spitz 2015, at 15.
223  See Court of Appeal of Paris, decision of 26 June 2013, No. 10/24329, cited in Spitz 2015, at 15.
224  Texto Refundido de la Ley de Propiedad Intelectual (TRLPI), approved by Royal Legislative Decree 1/1996 of April 12, as
amended.
225  Art. 1 TRLPI.
226  See Art. 10(1) TRLPI.
227  See Spanish Supreme Court (Tribunal Supremo) of 7 June 1995, n. STS 3284/1995 (ECLI:ES:TS:1995:3284).
228  See Spanish Supreme Court (Tribunal Supremo) of 30 January 1996, n. STS 7779/1996 (ECLI:ES:TS:1996:7779).
229  See Bercovitz & Bercovitz & Corral, in Geller & Bently, 2[1][b] and case law cited in fn. 5, in particular Court of Appeal of
Barcelona, 22 February 2005, n. 118095 (denying protection to a method of practising sport).
Page 35 of 69
All the same, case law is not uniform on the concept of originality. For example, floor plans were
denied protection because “they do not bring anything new to the cultural acquis and their only goal
is to be used as models or standards so that the technician or the user can execute them”.230 On the
other hand, however, the Supreme Court granted protection to works with a very low creative input,
such as the content of the job ads section of a newspaper.231
7.2 Derivative works
Similarly to France, Spanish law explicitly recognises protection to “composite works” which are
defined  as  new  works  that  “incorporate  a  pre-existing  work  without  the  collaboration  of  its
author.”232
Moreover, Art.11 TRLPI grants protection to derivative works such as translations,  adaptations,
revisions, musical arrangements and any transformation of a literary, artistic, or scientific work. As
usual, protection is afforded without prejudice to the rights in the original work.233
Derivative works and composite works must be “original creations” in order to attract protection in
their  own  right.  In  literature  the  elements  of  “proportionality”  as  well  as  “autonomous  and
substantial novelty” have been identified in order to explain the generation of a new work which has
been integrated into or derived from the pre-existing one.234 Authors of derivative works will be
granted protection only in relation to the new authorial additions, although in practice it might be
hard to determine where the primary works ends and the secondary starts.235
7.3 Photographic works and non original photographs
Spanish TRLPI not only grants protection to photographic works as original creations,236 but also to
“mere photographs”, although the distinction is not clearly specified in the Copyright Act, which,
slightly tautologically, only establishes that mere photographs are those not protected by Art. 10.237
According  to  the  Supreme  Court,  the  distinction  between  a  photographic  work  and  a  mere
photograph  lies  in  the  existence  of  some “creative  relevance”  that  could  meet  the  standard  of
“original creation” bearing the personality of the author.238 Analogously, it has been held that the
230  See AP Barcelona (sec.15) September 29, 2006 [Kitchen floor plans], translation provided by Spanish correspondent.
231  See Spanish Supreme Court (Tribunal Supremo) of 13 May 2002, n. STS 3347/2002 (ECLI:ES:TS:2002:3347).
232  See Art. 9(1) TRLPI
233  See Bercovitz & Bercovitz & Corral, in Geller & Bently, 2[3].
234  See Xalabarder, in Hilty & Nérisson (eds.), 2012, at 930.
235  Id.
236  See Art.10(1)(h) TRLPI.
237  See  Art.128 TRLPI.
238  See Spanish Supreme Court (Tribunal Supremo), 5 April 2011, n. 214/2011, which denied protection to photographs of food
products taken for a food catalogue arguing that they lack the minimal amount of creativity required to meet the standard of
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circumstance that the author incorporates into the work “the product of his intelligence”, i.e. an act
of very personal character, leads to the creation of a photographic work.239
On the other hand, courts denied the qualification as photographic works to some photos published
as part of an encyclopedia because the fact that the photographs were taken with technical precision
is  not  relevant  to  qualify  them  as  photographic  works  “por  muy  complejo  que  haya  sido  el
procedimiento  de  obtención  del  ejemplar  fotografiado”  but  were  accorded  protection  as  “mere
photographs”.240 Interesting to note the fact that in this case,  in order to obtain the photograph,
aspects  such  as  the  selection  of  the  lenses,  lighting,  use  of  the  right  combination  of  filters,
adjustment of the tripod and selection of the diaphragm were considered mere technical activities
not personal enough as to consider the photograph the “daughter of the intelligence, ingenuity and
inventiveness of a person”.241 Nevertheless, choosing the light, angle and frame of the photo can
qualify photographs as works as long as “they are the result of their author’s intelligence and not a
mere reproduction of an image”.242
Mere photographs enjoy the exclusive right of reproduction, distribution and communication to the
public on the same terms as they are accorded to the authors of photographic works, with one major
exception:  protection  only  lasts  25  years  from production.243 In  principle,  no  moral  rights  are
granted to the maker of a mere photograph.244 Interestingly, the Act does not mention the right of
adaptation within the rights granted by Art. 128, which lead courts to deny the existence of this
prerogative to makers of mere photographs.245
Acts of digitisation seem excluded from the protection afforded by photographic works in all those
cases  where it  is  not  possible  to  identify  the  author's  personality. This  is  certainly  the  case  in
processes of digitisation of texts and images which are largely automated or semi-automated. In
cases of objects, once again, it must be established on a case by case basis whether the personality
of the author is present in the photograph, which seems to be an unlikely outcome when the result
sought is to document, not reinterpret, the reality. The protection granted by Art. 128 seems to be
available  in  the latter  case,  i.e.  photographs of three-dimensional  objects  which usually  require
some  basic,  technical,  and  usually  not  creative  decision.  The  automated  or  semi-automated
digitisations of books and images, nevertheless, seems to fall outside the scope of mere photographs
in that it is only an act of (digital) reproduction.
“original creation”: the technique of “painting with light” which is very common in professional food catalogue professional
photographers does not meet the standards of creativity and originality, and therefore the available protection is that of “mere
photographs”; See also Tribunal Supremo, 24 June 2004, n. 542/2004.
239  See Spanish Supreme Court (Tribunal Supremo), 29 March 1996, n. STS 7969/1996 (ECLI:ES:TS:1996:7969).
240  See Court of Appeal of Barcelona (Audienica Provincial) of 29 July 2005, n. SAP B 7715/2005 (ECLI:ES:APB:2005:7715)
[Enciclopedia Catalana]. In the same sense, other rulings by the same court: Court of Appeal of Barcelona 20 December 2004, n.
SAP B 15228/2004 (ECLI:ES:APB:2004:15228) [El Mundo de los Insectos] denying copyright protection to some photos of
butterflies regardless of the technical effort and precision (lighting, angle, etc) involved in taking them. Similarly, denying moral
rights protection to mere photographs done by a free-lance photographer  for a  newspaper, see Spanish Supreme Court 31
December 2002, n. STS 8943/2002 (ECLI:ES:TS:2002:8943) [Diario ABC].
241  See Spanish Supreme Court  (Tribunal Supremo), 7 June 1995, n. STS 3284/1995 (ECLI:ES:TS:1995:3284).
242  See  Court  of  Appeal  of  Barcelona  (Audiencia  Provincial),  September  10,  2003,  n.  SAP  B  4681/2003
(ECLI:ES:APB:2003:4681) [Cabo de Creus]. In this case, the photos had been published by a newspaper without mentioning the
name of the author (a well-known professional who had received several distinctions and awards for his professional work and
had also published a manual on photography.
243  See Art. 128 TRLPI.
244  See Spanish Supreme Court  31 December 2002,  n.  STS 8943/2002 (ECLI:ES:TS:2002:8943)  [Diario ABC]  denying any
infringement for the publication of some mere photographs without mentioning the author’s name.
245  See Bercovitz A., Bercovitz G., Corral M., in Geller&Bently, 9[1][a][v].
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Some supporting guidance on the latter aspect may perhaps be found in a case dealing with the
different issue of the reproduction of a (literary) work in the public domain, which, under Spanish
law, is  potentially  protected by a related right  on typographical  arrangements of public domain
works.246 In  this  case  the  Court  only  considered  whether  or  not  the  new  edition  had  enough
“singularities” to qualify for protection and concluded against it. The court ruled that the “mere
reproduction of a work in the public domain, despite being technically perfect and sophisticated, did
not have any singularity that could make the publication distinguishable from others”.247
8. Italy
8.1 Originality
Italian  copyright  law  protects  works  of  ingenuity  of  creative  character  (opere  dell'ingegno  di
carattere  creativo)  belonging  to  the  fields  of  literature,  music,  arts,  architecture  and
cinematography, regardless of the manner or form of expression.248 Art. 2 offers a non-exhaustive
list  of  subject  matter  to  illustrate  what  types  of  works  can  find  recognition  under  the  general
categories listed under Art. 1.249
The  open-ended  nature  of  Art.  2  is  confirmed  by  the  plain  meaning  of  the  provision  (“in
particolare”) and serves the purpose of illustrating which kind of subject matter can fall within the
categories of Art. 1. This aspect has never raised particular debate among scholars or courts and in
the past, new forms of expression not contemplated by previous formulations of Art. 2, such as
photographs or computer programs, were considered protected by extensive judicial interpretation
long before statutory intervention.250
Regarding Art. 1, however, views are not uniform. It has been argued that it exhaustively lists the
protected categories within which the subject matter illustratively enunciated in Art. 2 has to find
proper place.251 In particular, one author submitted that the concept of work of authorship and the
categories  included  in  Art.  1  are  flexible  enough  to  be  extensively  interpreted  to  include  new
technological  developments  and  forms  of  expression.  Nevertheless,  they  constitute  a numerus
clausus which  cannot  offer  protection  to  any intellectual  creation  whatsoever.252 Accordingly, a
hypothetical new form of expression made possible by technological evolution should be tested
246  See  Art.129.2 TRLPI. This aspect has been suggested by the Spanish correspondent. 
247  See Commercial Court of Madrid (Juzgado de lo Mercantil) of 14 June 2005, n. AC/20051078 [Libro de Horas de Carlos V].
248  See Art. 1 Italian Copyright Act of 1941 (“Legge 22 aprile 1941, n. 633 sulla Protezione del diritto d'autore e di altri diritti
connessi al suo esercizio”) as amended. A similar definition is present in Art. 2575 of the Italian Civil Code.
249  See Autieri et al., 2012, at 548.
250  See Autieri et al, 2012 at 548.
251  See Fabiani M., Il diritto d'autore, in Rescigno, 1983, 132; Marchetti & Ubertazzi, 2012, at 1326; Autieri et al., 2012, at 548
252  See Autieri et al., 2012 at 548.
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against the categories listed in Art. 1: failure to fall within one of these typified categories would
lead to the denial of copyright protection.253
It is clear from Art. 1 definition that only an expressive form is protected and not the underlying
idea; however, as seen for other continental copyright systems no fixation requirement is present.254
Regarding the type of originality required, the literal element present in the Act explicitly refers to
creativity. Creativity is usually identified as “simple” in the sense that it is present when the author
operates discretionary choices in relation to the forms to express an idea within a sufficient number
of alternatives.255 This concept of creativity seems perfectly in line with the recently EU harmonised
standard of the “author's own intellectual creation”256 and it has led Italian scholars and courts to the
attainment of principles similar to those identified by the ECJ.257
8.2 Derivative works
Art. 4 of the Italian Copyright Act affords protection to creative elaborations of works, such as
translations in another language, transformations from a literary or artistic form into another one,
modifications or additions that constitute a substantial  remake of the original work, adaptations,
“reductions” (intended as shorter versions of protected works), compendia, and variations which do
not constitute original works. Protection is granted without prejudice to the rights existing on the
primary work.
Consequently, derivative works constitute a distinct work independent but derived from the primary,
which  is  protected  as  long  as  it  shows  the  required  degree  of  originality  in  its  own  right.258
Naturally,  works  that  are  only  inspired  by  other  works  but  not  derived  from them,  constitute
independent, primary creations and are protected accordingly.
The Italian Supreme Court, in a case on drawings inserted in a tourist guide of the city of Venice,
established that creative elaborations are characterized by the presence of a recognizable creative
contribution in the derivative work and found that the disputed images were creative elaborations of
previous pictures of the city.259 The creative contribution consisted in choosing a two-dimensional
rather than a three-dimensional perspective and a “black and white” style rather than the original
colour. Similarly, it was found that adding a soundtrack to a silent movie or making a rock-and-roll
song from a piece of classical music constitute creative elaborations.260
8.3 Non original photographs
253  No case law on this specific matter has been found.
254  See Marchetti & Ubertazzi, 2012, at 1328.
255  See Marchetti & Ubertazzi, 2012, at 1330.
256  See above Sec. 2.2
257  See Marchetti & Ubertazzi, 2012, at 1330.
258  See Piola Caselli, 1943, at  234; Greco & Vercellone, 1974 at, 83; Marchetti & Ubertazzi, 2012, at 1330.
259  See Italian Supreme Court (Corte di Cassazione) 27 October 2005, n. 20925.
260  See Court of Appeal of Milan, 19 December 2000, and Tribunal of Milan (court of first instance), 31 May 1999.
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Until 1979 the current Italian Copyright Act protected photographs only by way of a related right
whose term of protection was set to 20 years from creation (or 40 years in cases of photographs of
figurative  art  and of  architectural  works).261 Nevertheless,  even before  the  explicit  inclusion  of
photographs as a protected subject matter scholars argued that when general requisites of copyright
protection were present, photographs could be considered as artistic works.262
Following  the  1979  reform,  Art.  2  n.  7  afforded  protection  to  photographic  works  and  works
realised with processes that can be assimilated into photography, except in the case of “simple
photographs” which are specifically regulated in Art. 87.
In accordance to the current legal situation, original photographic works attracting full copyright are
those that incorporate the personality of the author which is manifested through elements such as
the choice and the combination of visual effects, or the composition of the subject/object of the
picture.263 Creativity, it has been argued, can also be present in the “sensitivity of the photographer
who is able to catch the moment in which the reality manifest itself” in unique images, which, once
fixed on film, can be enjoyed by the public.264
In literature, especially in the past, it was argued that in order to qualify for copyright protection
photographs  needed to  possess  an evident  creative  contribution  of  the  author. Similarly, courts
interpreted the creative requirement in the sense of a particularly high level of originality.265 More
recently, however, both literature and case law seem to have adopted a different approach whereby
the  originality  threshold  of  photographs  is  aligned  to  the  same  level  as  that  of  other  subject
matter.266 This approach seems in line with EU law and recent ECJ case law.267
The  Italian  Copyright  Act  affords  specific  protection  to  non  original  photographs  or  “simple
photographs”. Accordingly, Article 87 establishes that the images of persons or of aspects, elements
or  events  of  natural  or  social  life,  obtained by photographic  or  analogous processes,  including
reproductions of works of figurative art and photograms of cinematographic film, shall be protected
by a right related to copyright. This right lasts 20 years from the date of production and grants the
maker of the photograph the right of reproduction and distribution and, most likely, the right of
adaptation; moral rights, however, are not explicitly recognised.268
The form of protection under scrutiny focuses on the technical competence of the operator who
realises  the photographs and on his ability  to capture the moment represented in the picture.269
Consequently, the requirement for this peculiar form of protection is the special “technical know-
261  See Law (Decree of the President of the Republic, d.p.r.) 8 January 1979, n.19 amending the Italian Copyright Act. At the basis
of the reform was the consideration that the term of protection of 20 years (instead of the 25 year term mandated by Berne) and
the absence of moral rights recognition was not in full compliance with Italy's international obligations; See generally Autieri et
al, at 568. Under the old Copyright Act of 1865 photographs were not protected until a 1925 legislative reform that recognised
them as a copyright subject matter, but limited their protection to 20 years; See Marchetti & Ubertazzi, 2012, at 1338.
262  See Marchetti & Ubertazzi, 2012, at 1338.
263  Id.
264  Id.
265  See Greco & Vercellone, 1974, at 385; Fabiani, 1969, Court of first instance of Florence (Trib. Firenze), 16 February 1994, in
Dir. Aut., n. 3, 1994, 480; Mezzetti, 2012, at 12.  
266  See Autieri et al., at 568; Marchetti & Ubertazzi, 2012, at 1338.
267  See above Part I.
268  See Marchetti & Ubertazzi, 2012, at 1662.
269  See Ubertazzi, 1998. In case law, Court of first instance of Milan (Tribunale Milano) 9 November 2000, in AIDA, 2002, 831;
Court of first instance of Rome (Trib. Roma), 24 February 1998, in Dir. Inf., 1998, 793.
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how” of the photographer, which must be kept distinct from the original personal interpretation of
the author.270
Nonetheless, if photographs are intended to merely reproduce existing objects or documents they
will not benefit from any form of protection. This can be inferred from the second part of Art. 87
which  establishes  that  photographs  of  writings,  documents,  business  papers,  material  objects,
technical designs and similar products are not protected. Therefore, provided that photographs only
perform a pure documentation function protection is excluded. According to the Italian Supreme
Court, documentation purposes are excluded from the scope of protection of simple photographs
and consequently so long as photographs pursue objectives other than documentation they qualify
for protection even if they reproduce material objects.271 The ratio of the norm is to deny protection
in  cases  of  mere  reproductive  photographs  of  material  objects  which  are  intended  to  merely
“document” the object, without an appreciable effort of the technical and professional abilities of
the photographer and of his inventiveness”272
Art. 90 establishes specific conditions in order to enjoy the protection afforded by the related right.
Accordingly,  simple  photographs  must  indicate  the  name  of  the  photographer  (or  of  the
employer/commissioner), the year of production and the name of the photographed work of art.273
These conditions are not constitutive of the right, but required in order to make the remedy readily
available to the plaintiff: their absence will permit unauthorized reproductions, including in absence
of the fair compensation provided for in the remainder of the Act, unless the photographer proves
the bad faith of the reproducer.
Accordingly,  acts  of  automated  digitisations  are  excluded  from  the  protection  granted  to
photographic works and to other photographs. Only photographs that show the personal input of the
author can be protected by copyright. When the input of the photographer consists in his technical
know-how but does not achieve the more demanding threshold of a personal stamp, non original
photograph protection may be available, but only at the conditions outlined above.
270  See Court of first instance of Milan (Tribunale di Milano), specialized section in intellectual property, of 11 October 2006, in
IDA 08, 83 (holding that the photograph of a famous artist during a performance does not contain the personal input of the
author).
271  See Italian Supreme Court (Corte di Cassazione) 21 giugno 2000, n 8425, in AIDA 2000.
272  Id. According to a different approach the second paragraph of art. 87 excludes from protection all mechanical reproductions of
material objects; See Sarti,  2000. Yet another approach suggested that the mechanical process would generally exclude any
exclusive right; See, Court of first instance of Milan (Trib. Milano), 7 September 2000, in AIDA 2001, 565.
273  In the case of a photograph of a work of art, although the Act remains silent at this regard.
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9. Poland
9.1 Originality
The Polish Copyright Act affords protection to any manifestation of creative activity of individual
nature, expressed in any form irrespective of its value, purpose or form of expression (art. 1.1).274
Art. 1.2 lists among other protected works literary, artistic and photographic works.
A creative activity of individual nature requires that a work is novel to the author and that it is not
copied.275 Evidence of creativity could be found in the fact that a work was not the result of routine
mechanical work, nor fully determined by its assumed goal or function, but rather the outcome of its
author's personal or individual decisions and choices.276 In order to ascertain whether the “creative
activity” is present, the Supreme Court indicated to inquiry whether a work is “characteristic of a
given  artist  and  bears  characteristic  features  which  enable  it  to  be  distinguished”  from  other
works.277
Additionally, in a recent decision the Supreme Court introduced the test of “statistical uniqueness”
in order to determine whether the work possesses individual  character. According to the Court,
“examining  whether  an  identical  or  a  very  similar  work  has  been  created  earlier  and  whether
creating an identical work by another person in the future is statistically probable” is a decisive
factor. In the case of a negative finding, “the existence of the individual character of the work” is
likely.278
Nevertheless, the originality standard set by courts should not be placed at particularly high level. In
another recent decision, the Supreme Court granted copyright protection to a “calories calculator”
constituted  by  two  paper  circles  which  could  be  rolled  to  present  some  general  facts  about
nutrition.279 On the other hand, however, the same court declined protection  to  reproductions of
official symbols used on Police uniforms such as Polish coat of arms and ranks distinctions, which
were claimed to constitute creative derivatives of the unprotected official materials.280
9.2 Derivative works
Article  2  of  the  Polish  Copyright  Act  establishes  that  a  work  derived  from another  work,  in
particular  its  translation,  modification  or  adaptation,  shall  be  the  object  of  copyright  without
prejudice to the rights in the original work. The originality required in cases of translations and
274  See Law n. 83 of February 4, 1994 on Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, as amended (the English version here referred to is
the one available on the WIPO website and updated to the last amendment of October 21, 2010).
275  See Barta & Markiewicz, in Geller & Bently, 2013, at 2[1][b].
276  Id.
277  See Polish Supreme Court, 31 June 1998, I PKN 196/98, OSP 1999, reported in reported in Barta & Markiewicz, in Geller &
Bently, 2013, at 2[1][b].
278  See Polish Supreme Court, 27 February 2009,  V CSK 337/08, OSP 2010/3/33, reported in Barta & Markiewicz, in Geller &
Bently, 2013, at 2[1][b].
279  See Polish Supreme Court, 25 January 2006, I CK 281/05 (reported and translated by the Polish national reporter).
280  See Polish Supreme Court, 13 January 2006, III CSK 40/05 (reported and translated by the Polish national reporter).
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adaptations is of the same kind as for primary works and has to be ascertained throughout the same
tests.281
Sec. 4 of Art. 2 clarifies that the work produced under the mere inspiration of another author's work
shall  not  be considered as  a derivative  work.  In order  to  be considered a  derivative  work,  the
adaptation needs to incorporate enough creative elements from the prior work, so that the new work
communicates the contents of the prior one.282
The primary work right-holder's consent is of course necessary for any creation and exploitation of
a secondary, derived work (Art. 2.2). The Act permits the owner to withdraw his or her consent if
the derivative work has not been exploited within five years from the date in which the consent was
given.283 Art. 2.5 establishes that copies of the derivative work must identify the original author and
the title of the primary work.
9.3 Photographic works and Non original photographs
As seen above, Polish legislation recognises protection to photographic works which are explicitly
listed in Art. 1.2 n.3; no special protection is available for non original photographs.
In  a  1998  decision,284 the  Polish  Supreme  Court  evaluated  the  originality  of  photographies
comprised in a museum collections and realised by an employee whose assigned task was to gather
“photographic documentation of museum's objects”. The court ruled that the photographs were not
original arguing that the employee was instructed to prepare representations of the collection not in
a creative, but in a “reproductive” way, that is to say “only the art of the painter was meant to be
visible, not the art of the photographer”.285
The  decision,  while  representing  an  important  precedent  in  the  field  of  photographic  works
objectively  representing  reality, attracted  some criticism.  It  is  reported  that  the  court  based  its
reasoning on the content of the agreement reached by the two parties, which may well be used to
determine  the fate  of  negotiable  copyright  elements  (e.g.  transfer  or  reservation  of  rights,  joint
ownership, specific monetary compensations), but cannot be used to determine whether a work of
authorship has been created.286 The latter condition should transcend the intention of the party or
parties involved in the creative process and only focus on the original creative result.287
In  another  case,  a  photograph  of  a  painting  was  considered  not  copyrightable  since  it  merely
reproduced “a defined set of colours without any alterations in their internal characteristics”. In the
281  See Barta & Markiewicz, in Geller & Bently, 2013, at 2[3].
282  Id.
283  See Art. 2.3 Polish Copyright Act.
284  Polish Supreme Court, 26 June 1998, I PKN 196/98, (reported and translated by the Polish national reporter).
285  Id.
286  While this criticism is certainly correct, it must also be noted that often – and in particular in difficult cases – Courts look at any
possible  factual  basis  in  order  to  determine  whether  the results  of  the efforts  of  the photographer  possess  any  additional
creativity. Therefore, it is plausible that the intention of the author is evaluated as an historical antecedent that contributed to the
achievement of said result; See Barta & Markiewicz, in Geller & Bently, 2013, at 2[3].
287  Id.
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opinion of the court only a photograph susceptible of being “treated as an interpretation” of the
painting could constitute a “creative activity” and therefore be protected by copyright.288
In the light of the above, it seems that acts of digitisation of texts and images are certainly outside
the scope of photographic works, since “only the art  of the original  author and not that  of the
photographer” should be visible. The same conclusion seems to hold true for the digitisation of
objects,  in  all  those  cases  where  the  digitisation  is  a  mere  digital  reproduction  of  the  object.
Nevertheless, it must be kept in mind that the level of originality should not be mistakenly placed at
a too high standard: the free and creative choices of a creative photographer, which need to be
assessed on a case by case basis, could, especially in cases of “artistic” photography of works of art,
be considered authorial.
10. UK
10.1 Originality
In the United Kingdom copyright law is regulated pursuant to the Copyright, Design and Patents
Act  1988  (CDPA 1988).  Copyright  protection  is  recognised  to  literary,  dramatic,  musical,  and
artistic works, films, sound recordings, broadcasts, and published editions (or typographical works).
The UK Act lists exhaustively the categories of works that can qualify for copyright protection and
consequently  a  work,  in  order  to  enjoy  copyright  protection,  has  to  fall  within  one  of  the
aforementioned eight categories.289
In order to attract protection under the CDPA, works must be original, at least for literary, dramatic,
musical  and  artistic  works.  In  contrast,  sound  recordings,  films,  broadcasts  and  typographical
arrangements  do not need to be original  and it  suffices that  they are not copied from previous
works.290 Fixation is an explicit requirement for literary, dramatic and artistic works, which need to
be recorded in a material form.291
The concept of originality traditionally applied in the UK by courts is that of “skill,  judgement
and/or labour”292 or variations thereof, where words such as “capital”, “effort”, “industry”, “time”,
“knowledge” and similar have been employed over time by different courts.293 It has been noted,
however, that “much of the case law seems inconsistent and, according to one commentator the
dividing line between original  .  .  .  works, and unoriginal  .  .  .  works, remains an uncertain and
shifting one”.294
288  See Court of Appeal, Warsaw, July 5, 1995, I Acr 453/95, reported in Barta & Markiewicz, in Geller & Bently, 2013, at 2[3].
289  See Bently & Sherman, 2014, at 58 and seq.
290  See Bently & Sherman, 2014, at 92.
291  Id., at 91.
292  See Ladbroke v William Hill, [1964] 1 All ER 465.
293  See Bently & Sherman, 2014, at 97.
294  Id, at 96 [citations omitted].
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Looking at the case law, it can certainly be said that some basic requirements are necessary in order
for  the  British  originality  concept  to  arise.  Accordingly,  skill,  judgement  and  labour  must  be
substantial in amount and of the right kind. Regarding the former, face painting, titles and slogans
have been found not original as the amount of labour in these cases was found to be insubstantial. 295
Regarding the latter aspect, it has been found that a considerable amount of labour could not lead to
an original result: “copying per se, however much skill or labour may be devoted to the process,
cannot make a work original”.296
Whether and to what extent the traditional standard of skill, judgement and labour survives, or more
correctly, is compliant with the EU mandated standard of “author's own intellectual creation” will
probably be discussed by courts and commentators in the years to come. Thus far, it can be said that
UK courts  have given recognition  the new ECJ standard,  but  interpreted  it  as  in line  with the
traditional UK one.297
Nevertheless, it must be noted that the same ECJ clarified that mere skill and judgement cannot lead
to  the  “author's  own  intellectual  creation”,  which  is  reached  only  through  free  and  creative
choices.298 It has been recently submitted that the two standards are simply different (although in
large parts overlapping) and the UK traditional standard is not always “just lower” than the EU one.
In  particular,  cases  where  very  little  labour  was  spent  (e.g.  11 words),  which  nonetheless  can
constitute the author's own intellectual creation, might not necessarily pass the “skill, judgement
and labour” standard.299
10.2 Derivative works
Sec. 21(3) CDPA establishes that translations,  versions of dramatic works, and arrangements of
computer programs, databases and musical works are acts reserved to the right-holder. Sec. 21(4)
clarifies that in relation to a computer program a translation includes a version of the program in
which it is converted into a different computer language or code. Accordingly, courts have protected
compilations, translations, and adaptations of existing materials, as well as arrangements of music
and engravings.300
However, in order to be protected the derivative work must have “some quality or character which
the raw material did not possess, and which differentiates the product from the raw material”.301
Considerable labour and expertise are not sufficient to render an adaptation original and to qualify it
as a protected derivative work.302 “There must in addition be some element of material alteration or
embellishment which suffices to make the totality of the work an original work”.303
295  See e.g. Merchandising Corporation v. Harpbond, [1983] FSR 32.
296  See Interlego AG v. Tyco Industries [1989] AC 217, 263; See generally, Bently & Sherman, 2014, at 98.
297  See e.g. Temple Island Collections Ltd v. New English Teas Ltd., [2012] EWPCC 1, at 18.
298  See Football DataCo., see generally supra Part I.
299  See Bently & Sherman, 2014, at 112.
300  Id.
301  See Macmillan v. Cooper (1924) 40 TLR 186, 188.
302  See Bently & Sherman, 2014, at 113.
303  See Interlego v. Tyco Industries [1989] AC 217, 268.
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10.3 Photographic works and non original photographs
The CDPA defines photographic works as recordings of light or other radiation on any medium on
which an image is produced or from which an image may by any means be produced, and which is
not part of a film.304 The CDPA does not offer explicit protection to non original photographs.
As seen in the first part of this study, Art. 6 of the Term Directive allows Member States to provide
protection  for  “other  photographs”,  meaning  photographs  that  are  not  the  author's  intellectual
creation. However, nothing is said about the type of protection that MS are allowed to provide for
these non original photographs.305 The logical conclusion would be that interested MS should devise
a special form of protection, or in any case a form of protection different from the one granted to
original photographs (i.e. copyright). However, the Directive does not clearly state this, and it has
been argued that non original photographs can be protected by standard copyright.306
As it has been noted, the better view is that the “protection of other photographs must be by means
of  a  related  right  rather  than  copyright”,  which  means  that  non  original  photographs  are  not
protected under UK law.307 However, this point is not completely settled. Accordingly, it  cannot
entirely be discarded the eventuality that UK law protects both “EU original” photographs in virtue
of  the first  part  of  Art.  6  Term Directive  and “UK original”  (i.e.  skill,  judgement  and labour)
photographs in virtue of the last part of Art. 6 by the same tool: copyright.308 Whereas acceptable on
a purely theoretical level, this hypothesis it is not currently supported by any case law, nor by the
dominant literature.309 For example, in Temple Island Collections Ltd v. New English Teas Ltd it was
held that an image of a London double-decker bus was original in the European sense.310 The Court,
in its reasons, acknowledged the harmonising effects of both Infopaq and Painer311 and borrowed
the view of the Austrian Supreme Court in a decision in which it recognised (EU) originality in
most amateur photographs.312
In dealing with digitisation of works of art under UK law, a reference to the “Graves' case” cannot
be omitted. The case refers to the concept of originality in photographs of works of art under the old
Copyright Act of 1862. Against a claim that such photographs cannot be considered original as they
represent a copy of an already existing work, the Court replied that all photographs are copies of
some object,  yet  they  can be  original.313 Subsequently, the Graves'  Case,  or  more correctly  its
proper interpretation,  was at the centre of the 1998 case Bridgeman I where a US court had to
304  See  Sec. 4(2) CDPA.
305  See Article 6 and Recital 16 Term Directive which indicate that no criteria other than that of “the author’s own intellectual
creation reflecting his personality” can be applied to determining protection of photographic works, and aspects such as merit or
purpose are explicitly excluded. On the other hand, the protection of other photographs is left to national law.
306  See Walter & Von Lewinski, 2010, at 8.6.12.
307  Bently & Sherman, 2014, at 112.
308  See Bently & Sherman, 2014, at 108, also hypothetically admitting, but not supporting, the possibility that the old British
originality standard can in fact survive – with the exception of databases – since it does not only protect original works, but also,
in the light of the low standard, against unfair competition, which could be preserved also in areas of EU harmonisation.
309  See Cornish et al., 2013, at 444; Bently & Sherman, 2014, at 108.
310  See Temple Island Collections Ltd v. New English Teas Ltd., [2012] EWPCC 1.
311  “At trial it was common ground that the impact of European Union law meant that the judgment of the CJEU in the  Infopaq
case (C-5/08 [2010] FSR 20) was such that copyright may subsist in a photograph if it is the author's own "intellectual creation".
After trial it was also common ground that the recent judgement of the CJEU in the  Painer case (C-145/10, 1st December 2011)
was to the same effect and did not necessitate further submissions from the parties”, See Temple Island Collections Ltd v. New
English Teas Ltd., [2012] EWPCC 1, at 18.
312  See Case Austrian Supreme Court (OGH), decision of 16 December 2003, n. 4 Ob 221/03h [Weinatlas].
313  For a detailed account of the case see Deazley, 2010, 3, 293 – 331, citing the Graves' Case (1868-69) L.R. 4 Q.B. 715 at 723.
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decided whether, under UK law, a photograph of a work of art  was protected.314 The US court
denied protection to the photograph, a decision that attracted much criticism and a lively scholarly
debate supporting one or the other position.315
Similarly, in Reject Shop,316 a case discussing enlarged photocopies' status, Leggatt L.J. observed
that:
“the  photocopying  …  did  not  result  in  a  depiction  substantially  different  from  the
drawings themselves. He devoted to the copying … no such skill and labour as conferred
originality of an artistic character. The process was wholly mechanical  and there is
nothing to suggest that enlargement was for any purpose of that kind. There was, in
short, no evidence before the magistrate of the exercise in the production of what he
called the “distorted photocopies” of any relevant skill and labour whatever. It follows
that  the  final  images were not  original  works  and so no copyright  could subsist  in
them.”317
Likewise,  in Antiquesportfolio.com,318 Neuberger J.,  holding in favour of the copyrightability  of
photographs of three-dimensional objects when enough skill is involved,319 admits that photographs
of two-dimensional items represent a hard case:
“The only possible difference … might be said to arise in the case of a purely
representational photograph of a two-dimensional object such as a photograph
or a painting”320
Nevertheless, Neuberger J. continues, it may well be the case that, if the photographer could show
some degree of skill and care in taking the photograph, he could claim originality in a photograph of
a two-dimensional item.321 The Court stresses that, whereas the case of two-dimensional objects is
not a point that needs to be decided, English authority on the issue (i.e. photographs of both 2D and
3D works) is not much of assistance.
The better view is in all probability that a picture of a work of art, including a painting, cannot be
excluded a priori from copyright protection just because the object photographed is not created or
staged by the photographer. The deciding factor should be whether “taking the photograph leaves
ample room for individual arrangements” such as motives, visual angles and lighting,322 that is to
314  See The Bridgeman Art Library Ltd. v. Corel Corporation, 36 F. Supp. 2d 191 (SDNY) 1999 [There are two judgements: On
November 13 1998 Kaplan J. granted the defendant's motion for a summary dismissal on the basis of UK law. The plaintiff
successfully moved for reconsideration and re-argument. On 26 February 1999 Kaplan J. granted again summary dismissal of
the case on the basis of US law].
315  See Deazley, 2010, at 309. The interpretation given by the US Court to UK law is considered “probably wrong” by Cornish et
al., 2013, at 444; See Garnett, 2000; Deazley, 2001; Stokes, 2001; Perry, 2003, at 696.
316  The Reject Shop Plc v Rober Manners [1995] F. S.R. 870, 876
317  Id. Se also Michalos 2004, at 3-019 – 3-020.
318  Antiquesportfolio.com Plc v Rodney Fitch & Co Ltd [2001] E.C.D.R. 5.
319  Such as for instance “in the positioning of the object (unless it is a sphere), the angle at which it is taken, the lighting and the
focus”, in “the instant photographs appear to have been taken with a view to exhibiting particular qualities, including the colour
(in the case of some items), their features (e.g. the glaze in pottery) and, in the case of almost all the items, the details” or in the
choice “of the particular item in order to find a typical example of a certain type of artefact, or a particularly fine example of a
certain type of artefact”; id., at 33 – 36.
320  Id., at 31.
321  Id., at 33.
322  See Temple Island Collections Ltd v. New English Teas Ltd., [2012] EWPCC 1, at 20.
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say, to free and creative choices that can “embellish” the result.323 Of course, the fact that the object
of the photograph is fixed and pre-existing, such as in the case of an object of art or a painting,
instead of being created by the photographer, reduces considerably the space for such arrangements,
but does not by itself exclude completely such a possibility.324 In these types of cases the court
should  verify  whether  the  photographer  was  able  to  put  the  stamp  of  his  personality  on  the
photograph in the act of taking the picture and eventually in its post-production, or, on the contrary,
whether it represents only a mere reproduction or a slavish copy.325
Accordingly, is to be excluded that mere acts of digitisation of text and images, which usually are
based on automated or semi-automated processes, can give rise to new rights. This seems correct
under the EU originality standard and most likely also under the “old” skill, judgement and labour
standard, although in the latter case the tests to be applied may differ. For the case of objects of art,
the considerations developed in the previous paragraph apply.
11. The Netherlands
11.1 Originality
The  Dutch  Copyright  Act  (Auteurswet326)  protects  original  works  in  the  literary,  scientific  and
artistic  fields  (Art.  1)  whatever  the  mode  or  form of  expression  and  provides  the  usual  non-
exhaustive list of protected works in Art. 10.
The criterion of originality is not specified in the Act but has been recognised as a requirement for
protection  by  the  courts  in  several  cases327.  “Originality”  (or  “oorsponkelijkheid”)  is  in  Dutch
practice typically used as a shorthand for a two-pronged test elaborated by the Supreme Court. The
work must have an “own, individual character” and “bear the personal stamp of the author”328. In
other words, to be original a work needs not only not to be copied from an earlier work,329 but it has
to be an intellectual  creation bearing the “personal stamp” of the author (“eigen oorspronkelijk
karakter en een persoonlijk stempel van de maker”).330
In particular, the “personal stamp of the author” is present when the work is the result of human
creation and of creative choices. Consequently, trivial expressions in which no creativity is involved
323  See Interlego AG v Tyco Industries Inc. [1988] 3 All E.R. 949 at 972.
324  “Ultimately however the composition of the image can be the product of the skill and labour (or intellectual creation) of a
photographer and it seems to me that skill and labour/intellectual creation directed to that end can give rise to copyright”; id., at
27.
325  See in this sense Nimmer, at 2.08[E][1] and [2].
326  See Law of 23 September 1912 containing new rules on copyright (Wet van 23 september 1912 houdende nieuwe regeling van
het auteursrecht).
327  Dutch Supreme Court, 4 January 1991, NJ 1991, 608, (Van Dale/Romme I).
328  See Spoor et al., 2005, at 59;  van Eechoud M., Hugenholtz P., van Gompel S., Guibault  L., van der Sloot B., Dutch report,
ALAI Study Days, Dublin, June 2011, at 1.
329  Dutch Supreme Court 30 May 2008 ( Endstra/Nieuw Amsterdam).
330  Hugenholtz, 1990, at 29. See also Dutch Supreme Court, 30 May 2008 ( Endstra/Nieuw Amsterdam); Dutch Supreme Court 4
January  1991 (Van Dale/Romme).
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fall outside the scope of copyright protection.331 However, according to the Dutch Supreme Court a
selection of unprotected elements – such as technical and functional elements, fashion or style – can
be copyright-protected if the selection manifests the personal stamp of the author.332
Interestingly, the Dutch Supreme Court had the opportunity to explicitly state that its traditional
criterion of “own original character and a personal stamp of the author” has the same meaning as
the new ECJ harmonised originality requirement of the “author's own intellectual creation”.333
11.2 Derivative works
Article 10-2 of the Dutch Copyright Act states that reproductions in a modified form of a work of
literature,  science  or  art,  such  as  translations,  musical  arrangements,  adaptations,  and  other
elaborations, can be protected as original, without prejudice to the primary work. In order to be
protected as reproductions in a modified form the listed transformative activities must be original,
i.e. they must possesses an “own original character and the personal stamp of the author”. Literature
is consistent in denying originality to acts such as media shifts or the mere digitisation of works,334
or to the conversion of a literary work into another writing form such as Braille since this type of
conversion is mere technical.335
Likewise, the conversion of a musical work in the form of a midi-file (which necessarily changes
the amount of information captured) was found to contain no own personal and original character
since the purpose of the specific file format is to capture or record the original work as closely as
possible.336 Similarly, a correction of a text without creative input is a reproduction and not a new
protected work.337  
Article 13 of the Dutch Copyright Act regulates the right of reproduction (verveelvoudiging) which
includes the right of adaptation. The article offers a non-exhaustive list of acts of adaptation which
include  translation,  arrangement  of  music,  cinematographic  adaptation  or  dramatization  and
generally any partial or total adaptation in a modified form, which cannot be regarded as a new,
original work.338 To qualify as a protected adaptation a work must be derived from the original
work,339 which requires that original protected elements are taken over from the primary work.340
Stylistic,341 technical342 and  other  elements  such as  ideas,  concepts  and facts  are  not  protected.
Generally, the nature of the initial  work has been taken into account to determine the scope of
protection in the evaluation of the infringement.343
331  Dutch Supreme Court 30 May 2008 ( Endstra/Nieuw Amsterdam), para. 4.5.1.
332  Dutch Supreme Court 23 February 2013 (Stokke/H3 Products) para. 3.4 (e).
333  Dutch Supreme Court 23 February 2013 ( Stokke/H3 Products) para. 4.2.  
334  Gielen & Visser, 2013, Art. 10(9).
335  Spoor et al., 2005, at 133.
336  District Court  Utrecht 7 May 1997, (Midi- files); protection could sought in the related right on phonograms.
337  District Court Haarlem 25 January 1983 (Dik Trom).
338  See Spoor, Verveelvoudigen: Reproduction and Apaptation under the 1912 Copyright Act, in Hugenholtz, Quaedvlieg, Visser,
2012, at 206.
339  Dutch Supreme Court 21 February 1992 (Barbie).
340  Dutch Supreme Court 28 June 1946 (Van Gelder/van Rijn).
341  Dutch Supreme Court 29 March 2013 (Broeren/Duijsen).
342  Dutch Supreme Court 16 June 2006 (Lancome/Kecofa) and Dutch Supreme Court 23 February 2013 (Stokke/H3 Products).
343  Dutch Supreme Court 5 January  1979 (Heertje Hollebrand c.s.) para. 5.
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11.3 Photographic works and non original photographs
Photographic works are protected by the Dutch Copyright Act,  which,  however, does not offer
specific protection to non original photographs. Photographic works, therefore are protected if they
possess an original character and bear the personal stamp of the author. Accordingly, a photograph
of a painting featuring the skills of the photographer, but lacking an own creativity would not result
in an original work.344
However,  such original  character  and personal  stamp should  not  be  reason to  believe  that  the
threshold  of  originality  is  particularly  high,  as  a  recent  district  Court  decision  finding  enough
originality in a picture of three shrimps on a plate, seems to suggest.345
Nonetheless, a mere technical photograph (a detail of a spout of a watering can) was found to lack
the  originality  required  to  reach  copyright  protection.346 Another  example  of  lack  of  original
character and personal stamp in a photograph is the Van de Rakt/Chasse Theater case.347 In this
case, a photograph of a woman lying in the moonlight was almost exactly copied. The minimal
differences between the two pictures were found not to constitute the result of creative choices but
rather of non-original functional requirements (e.g. specific instructions given by the commissioner)
and accordingly the second photograph was not a protectable work in its own right.348
344  Spoor et al., 2005, at 132.
345  See District Court Limburg, 9 April 2014 (Goudzwaard v Syzygy).
346  Dutch Supreme Court  9 March 1962 (Vitri)
347  Preliminary Court Breda, 8 April 2011 (Van de Rakt/Chasse Theater).
348  Preliminary Court Breda, 8 April 2011 (Van de Rakt/Chasse Theater), para. 7.5.
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Part III - Conclusions and recommendations
12) Conclusions and recommendations
12.1 Conclusions
The goal of this study was to establish whether acts of digitisation are liable to trigger copyright or
copyright-related  protection under EU law and the law of selected Member States.  Three main
copyright concepts were accordingly identified and analysed in detail: originality, derivative works
and (non) original photographs. The focus of the study was on the operations of cultural heritage
institutions, yet the analysis therein developed can be applied to most acts of digitisation.
The  main  finding  presupposes  a  classificatory  distinction.  Acts  of  digitisation  should  be
distinguished between those which merely reproduce an aspect of the reality (“the objective [and
the result] is to reach the highest possible grade of identity with the original”349) and those which
carry with an original contribution. While in the former case the availability of new copyright or
copyright-related  protection  can  be  excluded,  in  the  latter  it  may  be  available  under  certain
conditions.
Furthermore, the study demonstrated that the “dimension shifting” factor is a key element in the
quest for an original contribution: photographing three-dimensional objects commonly implies more
free and creative choices than photographing two-dimensional objects. The reason is quite obvious.
Current  photographic  apparatuses  (with  few,  and  for  present  purposes,  irrelevant  exceptions)
reproduce  the  photographed  items  in  two  dimensions.  If  the  photographed  object  is  in  three-
dimensions, in the passage from three to two dimensions there is a necessary loss of details, aspects,
angles, perspectives and other essential elements. Thus, it is often technically impossible to simply
reproduce an object, because the current technology does not allow it. Accordingly, a photographer,
constrained  by  technical  limitations  to  reproduce  only  some  of  the  details  or  elements  to  the
detriment  of  others,  is  requested  to  operate  choices  in  terms  of  angles,  perspective,  lighting,
positioning,  etc.  Depending  on the  specific  situation,  these  choices  can  represent  the  technical
know-how of a good technician, or even reach the level of free and creative choices through which
the photographer put his personal stamp onto the photographic work.
On the contrary, when the object of the photograph is already in two dimensions (a text, an image, a
print,  an etching,  etc.)  the  fixation  of  the  original  on film or  digital  support  is  almost  entirely
automated, quite similarly to what happens in activities such as reprography and photocopying. In
all  these  cases  it  is  possible  to  control  parameters  such  as  brightness,  contrast,  or  zoom;
nevertheless, these modifications do not amount to the author's own intellectual creation necessary
for protection. These are cases of mere reproduction, quite similarly to the case of photocopying
some pages of a book, being irrelevant whether the brightness or zoom have been adjusted.
Accordingly, under the modern EU originality standard digitisation of two-dimensional items are
rarely copyrightable as there is extremely little space for free and creative choices. Conversely, in
the case of three-dimensional items there is more leeway for free and creative choices in as much as
349  See AG Opinion in Case C-419/13 [Allposter], at 59.
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the work can be photographed from different angles or with the purpose of privileging a specific
side or profile of the item. The more free and creative choices – as exemplified in the discussed
French example of the moving object of art – the more likely it is that a court analysing the case
will find in favour of the copyrightability of the photograph. However, it is necessary that not only
the art of the author of the photographed object is present in the photography, but “also the art of the
photographer”.
Regarding the peculiar form of protection of “other” photographs, the technical skill or a minimum
of intellectual input (instead of the personality) of the maker constitutes the element that usually
triggers protection. However, as demonstrated, this type of protection – made possible by Art. 6
Term Directive and implemented in a handful of MS – has not been subject to any harmonisation
nor, for that matter, any guidance at the EU level, a situation that lead some commentator to identify
it  as  deficit  in  harmonisation.350 It  seems  plausible  that  in  countries  recognising  this  peculiar
neighbouring right,  digitisations  of three-dimensional  objects  and, in limited cases also of two-
dimensional  objects,  can  find  protection  when  the  photographer  expresses  some  appreciable
technical  skill  or  minimum  intellectual  input,  without  achieving  the  required  EU  originality
standard. The situation, however, is highly inhomogeneous among the countries offering protection
to other photographs.
These  conclusions  are  confirmed  by  the  results  of  the  case  studies,  which  were  employed  to
highlight the distinction between mere reproductions and authorial contributions and in particular
the role played by free and creative choices bearing the personal stamp of the author.
Fully automated reproductions – the first case scenario – such as digital photocopies, scanning or
other forms of digitisation, conceptually exclude the presence of the author's personal stamp and of
his personal choices. Absent an author and his choices, the mechanical act of turning an item into its
digital  representation  constitutes  a  mere  act  of  reproduction  lacking  any  original  input.  The
protection offered to “other” photographs by national legislation can also be ruled out, as this form
of protection requires the presence of either a minimum intellectual input or of the know-how of a
technician,  and  is  usually  excluded  (statutorily  or  by  judicial  interpretation)  in  cases  of  mere
reproduction  or  reproductive  photography.  At  the  same  time,  a  fully  automated  digitisation  is
conceivable mostly, if not exclusively, in cases of two-dimensional items. Books, papers, pictures,
images, prints and the like are reproduced in a two-dimensional to two-dimensional relationship. All
the details of the original can easily be reproduced in the representation and usually acts such as
staging or preparation of the object and parameters such as lighting, exposure and perspective are
absent  or  irrelevant  in  this  case.  Automatic  reproductions  of  three-dimensional  items,  on  the
contrary,  are  hardly  conceivable,  as  the  object  needs  to  be  prepared  for  the  digitisation  and
parameters  such as  the  side,  angle,  profile,  inclination  need to  be chosen.  Here the margin for
discretionary choices that will likely influence the result can be ample. In other words, the acts and
the conditions just excluded for the case of a two-dimensional item, can in fact acquire relevance in
the case of digitisation of three-dimensional objects.
Moving to the third scenario, photographs realised by professional photographers are likewise an
“easy” case and even more so when the photographed item is  a  three-dimensional  object.  The
reason does not obviously lie in the fact that the photographer is “professional”. This expression
(borrowed from the original Term Directive of '93) served to attract the focus on the relevance of
the human (as opposed to mechanic) activity and consequently to the possible presence of free and
creative  choices.  As  demonstrated  in  the  study, the  choices  necessary  to  digitally  (i.e.  to  two-
dimensionally) represent a three-dimensional object commonly accrue to the level of originality
350  See Benabou, 1997, at 385
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required for copyright protection, or, where available, the lower standard of “other” photographs.
The syllogism, however, is not automatic. As seen in the country specific analysis, national courts
should investigate – and not assume – that in digitally representing something that already exists,
such as a work of art, the photographer is in fact operating free and creative choices, and is not
merely documenting reality. This finding, for the reasons exposed above, is more likely in cases of
digitisation of three-dimensional objects rather than of two-dimensional objects.
Semi-automated digitisations – the second scenario – is clearly a borderline case and therefore of
dubious  categorisation.  Semi-automatic  digitisation  processes  can  in  fact  apply  to  both  two-
dimensional and three-dimensional objects and involve the role of a human facilitating the process.
The guiding principle is once more whether the human involvement in the digitisation is capable to
lead to free and creative choices. Similarly to the aforementioned two scenarios, three-dimensional
objects are better indicators of these types of choices than two-dimensional items. Nevertheless, the
decision should rest on a careful analysis of the role played by the producer of the photographic
representation.  The  relevance  of  the  neighbouring  right  protecting  non  original  photographs
probably  reaches  its  peak in  these  situations.  Cases  where a  human is  involved but  where his
personal stamp is probably absent (e.g. in the French case of aerial photographs of Paris), might
well  constitute examples where the protection offered to non-original  photographs by other MS
could be available. It is worth stressing once more, however, that there is a precise limit to the
subsistence  of  non  original  photographs:  these  should  not  protect  mere  reproductions  or
reproductive photography.
In conclusion, automated and semi-automated digitisations (such as scanning, digital photocopying
and  similar  activities)  of  text  and images  should  be  excluded  from the  protection  afforded by
copyright and, where it exists, by the related right protecting “other” photographs. In cases of three-
dimensional items, only a proper assessment of the circumstances of the case can disentangle the
complex issue of  the protection  of  photographs and even more  of  non original  photographs of
objects of art. The factors to consider in order to address the problem have been exposed in the
preceding paragraphs.  When the digitisation is carried out by human operators making a whole
array of possible choices the resulting image is likely to constitute a protected photograph, instead
of a mere reproduction.
From  a  policy  point  of  view,  the  study  documented  how  the  EU  legislature  harmonised  the
originality  level  for  photographic  works  with  a  certain  success.  It  would  have  certainly  been
desirable  that,  if  really  there  was  a  proven  need to  protect  non original  photograph,  the  same
legislature had offered a similar kind of guidance instead of favouring the non harmonised situation
created by the last sentence of Art. 6. Currently, in the light of a full harmonisation of the concept of
originality in the EU, the survival of a peculiar form of protection such as that afforded to “other”
photographs, rather than an element of flexibility, appears like a relic of a time when originality and
copyright where a matter of national rather than union law.
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12.2 Recommendations 
12.2.1) For Cultural Institutions
1) Cultural institutions interested in digitisation projects should verify the copyright status of the
items in their collections. Public domain items can be digitised without infringing third party rights.
Where existing, due consideration should be given to special forms of protection such as cultural
heritage codes (e.g. Italy and Greece).
2)  Digitisation  processes  can  only  exceptionally  give  rise  to  new  copyright  or  related  right
protection.  Mere digitisation (such as scanning, digital  photocopying, photographic reproduction
and similar activities) of texts, images and other two-dimensional items are commonly excluded
from the  protection  afforded  by copyright  and,  where  it  exists,  by  the  related  right  protecting
“other” photographs.
3) When digitising three-dimensional works, only a proper assessment of the specific conditions of
the digitisation process and of the status of the digitised items can disentangle the complex issue of
the protection of photographs and even more so of non original photographs of objects of art (where
available).
4)  When  proceeding  to  the  digitisation  of  archives,  cultural  institution  should  insert  in  the
contractual agreements with the digitising party clauses securing that the cultural institution is the
copyright holder – either original (e.g. work for hire) or derivative (transfer of rights) – of any
possible  right  originating  from the  digitisation  process.  This  precaution  will  secure  that  in  the
exceptional cases in which such rights may arise the cultural institution owns them.
12.2.2 For EU and MS legislatures
5) The European legislature,  in view of the full  realisation of an internal digital  market,  should
reconsider the opportunity of maintaining the last sentence of Art. 6 Term Directive in its current
form. Similarly to other neighbouring rights regulated in the same or in subsequent Directives, the
protection  for  “other”  photographs  should  be  object  of  a  direct  harmonising  intervention.  This
intervention should either indicate the main features of the right (subject matter, scope, duration,
rights and limitations), or – in absence of an enduring need for such type of protection – repeal it.
6) Member States implementing special forms of protection, such as cultural heritage codes, should
reconsider the opportunity to maintain those provisions in relation to the parts that create a virtual
extension of copyright protection beyond the boundaries established by EU law, thereby eroding the
public domain. In particular, the benefits in terms of financial revenues and public access and reuse
of cultural heritage of this solution, should be compared with more modern approaches based on
public  engagement  in  the  reuse  of  cultural  heritage  (e.g.  the  new  approach  taken  by  the
Rijksmuseum).
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Annex I –  Tables
Table I – Countries offering protection to “other” photographs
Country Source Object of protection Type of protection Duration
Germany Art. 72 
Copyright Act
minimum  of  personal
intellectual  input  (ein
Mindestmaß an persönlicher
geistiger Leistung)
Same as copyright as 
long as compatible
Limited recognition 
of moral rights 
(paternity).
50 years from 
production
Spain Art. 128 
Copyright Act
What is not protected by Art. 
10 Copyright Act 
(photographic works). 
Courts' definition is: 
photographs “lacking 
creative input”.
Reproduction, 
distribution, 
communication to the
public; No adaptation.
No moral rights
25 years from 
production.
Italy Art. 87 
Copyright Act
Technical and professional 
skills; “ images of persons or 
of aspects, elements or 
events of natural or social 
life, Excluded: writings, 
documents, business papers, 
material objects, technical 
designs and similar products”
Reproduction, 
communication, 
distribution, and most
likely adaptation.
No moral rights, but 
credit name if 
indicated. Some 
formal requirement to
make remedy 
effective.
20 years after 
making
Austria Art. 73 - 75  
Copyright Act
Photographs which are not a 
photographic work, lack 
originality and manufactured 
by photography or similar 
techniques
Assimilated to 
copyright (but 
reduced in some 
respect, such as 
adaptation).
Moral rights: 
Attribution and 
integrity (but reduced 
and some formality)
50 after 
production
Denmark Art. 70 
Copyright Act
Photographs which are not a 
photographic work (lack of 
originality)
Reproduction and 
making available to 
the public. Attribution
and integrity.
50 since the 
picture was 
taken
Finland Art. 49A 
Copyright Act
Photographs which are not a 
photographic work (lack of 
originality)
Reproduction in 
original and modified 
form and making 
available to the 
50 since the 
picture was 
made
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public. Attribution 
and integrity.
Iceland Art. 49 
Copyright Act
Photographs which are not a 
photographic work (lack of 
originality)
Reproduction making
available to the 
public.
50 years since 
picture was 
taken (Act No.
9/2006, Art. 
12).
Norway Art. 43a 
Copyright Act
Photographs which are not a 
photographic work (lack of 
originality)
Reproduction and 
making available to 
the public. Attribution
and integrity
15 p.m.a. (but 
min. 50)
Sweden Art. 49 
Copyright Act
Photographs which are not a 
photographic work (lack of 
originality)
Reproduction and 
making available to 
the public in original 
or altered form. 
Attribution and 
integrity.
50 after 
production
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Annex II – Questionnaire  
Europeana Awareness - A EU comparative legal study on the concepts of originality,
digitization, and derivative works in copyright law.
Questionnaire
Introduction
The objective of this  questionnaire  is  to  help Europeana Awareness find answers to the thorny
question of whether the digitization of images (painting, drawings, maps, photos, etc.), texts (books,
newspapers, letters, etc.), objects (statues, sculptures, vases, coins, etc.), films, phonograms, and TV
or radio broadcasts (altogether “the covered subject matter), gives rise to copyright or copyright-
related protection. Many times, in fact, cultural institutions participating in the Europeana network
do not apply a public domain mark or a CC0 waiver to the files they contribute alleging that such
digital representations of – often public domain – works enjoy some form of copyright or copyright-
related protection of which they are not the right-holders. While the expressed concerns deserve the
greatest  attention  and analysis,  it  is  this  project's  work-hypothesis  that  in  many instances  these
digital reproductions are in the public domain and they should be accordingly redistributed. In order
to  verify  and  hopefully  confirm  our  work-hypothesis  it  is  unavoidable  to  define  the  precise
boundaries of some copyright law key concepts for all the 28 EU countries. Accordingly, we have
drafted the following questionnaire  and subdivided it  into two parts.  In the first  part  we ask 4
general and open-ended questions on four key concepts of copyright law: originality, derivative
works, and existence and scope of protection of non-original material by ad-hoc related rights (such
as  the  protection  of  non  original  photographs  offered  by  some  jurisdiction  in  addition  to  the
protection afforded to photographic works). In the second part of the questionnaire we ask a number
of  multiple  choice  questions  that  focus  specifically  on  the  type  of  activity  that  leads  to  the
digitization process and the type and status of the material that is to be digitized.
Thank you in advance for your help in replying to this questionnaire, it represents an incredibly
valuable contribution towards the goal of a more open use and reuse of information and knowledge.
Part I – General open questions
Please answer the following questions in the given space (max 1 page per question). Please cite
correctly and extensively (e.g.: avoiding abbreviations and acronyms) any legal sources you refer to
such as laws, acts, decrees, case law, green papers, articles in journals, etc. Please also offer an
online link to the original text when available.  Additionally, if  available in English, please also
provide a link to the English version.
1) Please indicate the definition and/or relative standard of “originality” in your country on the basis
of  a)  statutory definition,  and b)  case  law (please  indicate  specific  decisions  especially  if  they
address  the  subject  matter  covered  by  this  research).  Please  also  indicate  if  the  standard  as
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implemented by courts has been subject to substantial modifications after the ECJ Infopaq-Painer
jurisprudence).
2) Please indicate the definition and/or standard of “derivative works” or equivalent (modifications,
adaptations, elaborations, abridgement, translation, media shifting, etc.) in your country on the basis
of a) statutory definition, and b) case law, with particular attention to specific cases that relate to the
covered subject matter.
3) Please indicate whether the law of your country recognizes a neighbouring right for non-original
photographs and what the conditions of protection are (criteria, duration, scope, etc.), on the basis of
a) statutory definition and b) case law. In case of positive answer, please indicate whether non-
original photographs also include scans of books or of photographs.
4) Please indicate if the law of your country (statutes and case law) specifies the scope of protection
for film's first fixations, phonograms, and TV/Radio broadcasts, and in particular whether acts of
digitization or remasterization of the originals are covered by the scope of the rights and therefore
require right-holders' authorization.
Part II – Multiple choice
Please answer by indicating the legal status of the act of digitization for any given subject matter
and also indicate  in  whom the  copyright  or  related  right  –  if  any  – will  vest.  If  there is  any
additional information that needs to be reported for a correct and complete answer, please use the
space below the table.
Basic case:
A major museum of your country is interested in digitizing its entire collection and to make it
available to the public. The collection is vast and includes among other items: images (painting,
drawings, maps, photos, etc.), texts (books, newspapers, letters, etc.), objects (statues, sculptures,
vases,  coins,  etc.),  audiovisual  and  cinematographic  works,  phonograms,  and  TV  and  radio
broadcasts.
Some of these materials  are in the public  domain (because either they were never protected or
because the term of protection has expired), while others are still protected by copyright or related
rights.  In  order  to  proceed,  the  museum  needs  to  know  whether,  for  copyright  purposes,  the
“digitization” of the following material leads to the creation of an independent work, of a derivative
work, of a material covered by a specific neighbouring or similar right, or leads to something not
covered by copyright law. Equally important is to know, in cases where a new right comes into
existence, who is the right-holder.
Action Category of work Indicate if the result is:
- an independent work 
(C);
- a derivative work 
(D);
- protected by a related
right (please specify);
Please indicate who is
the right-holder of the
newly created right, if
any
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- not protected (PD)
Automated 
reproduction/digitizatio
n realized in absence 
(or negligible presence)
of human intervention 
(e.g.: Google scanning 
automatically all books
of the entire 
collection).
Texts: protected
           in the public 
domain
Not protected
Images: protected
             in the public 
domain
Objects: protected
             in the public 
domain
Broadcasts: protected
             in the public 
domain
Films' fixations: 
protected
             in the public 
domain
Phonograms: protected
             in the public 
domain
Automated 
reproduction realized 
by human operator 
(e.g.: human operator 
taking 
pictures/manually 
photocopying 
collections for 
inventory/classificatory
purposes)
Texts: protected
             in the public 
domain
Images: protected
             in the public 
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domain
Objects: protected
             in the public 
domain
Broadcasts: protected
             in the public 
domain
Films' fixations: 
protected
             in the public 
domain
Phonograms: protected
             in the public 
domain
Reproduction operated 
by a specifically hired 
professional with the 
objective to realize 
high quality outputs 
(e.g.: photographer 
taking different shots in
different light 
conditions to create hi-
resolution images to be 
made available on the  
institution’s website)
Texts: protected
            in the public 
domain
Images: protected
            in the public 
domain
Objects: protected
             in the public 
domain
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Broadcasts
             in the public 
domain
Films' fixations
             in the public 
domain
Phonograms
             in the public 
domain
Additional remarks: Please use the given space in order to indicate any additional consideration 
regarding the multiple choice part. This space should be used in particular by those jurisdictions 
featuring special form of protection (e.g.: non-original photographs) which are not included in the 
multiple choice list above.
Page 67 of 69
Annex  III  – List  of  national
correspondents
Austria N/A
Belgium N/A
Bulgaria Teodora Tsenova, Djingov, Gouginski, Kyutchukov & Velichkov (DGKV), Sofia
Cyprus Tatiana Eleni Synodinou, University of Cyprus
Czech Republic Tomáš Dobřichovský, Charles University, Kříž
Croatia Vanja Kovacevic - Attorney at law
Denmark Maria Fredenslund, RettighedsAlliancen
Estonia Elise Vasamäe, Aavik & Partners Law Office, Tallinn
Finland Ville Oksanen, Aalto University
France Brad Spitz, YS Avocats, Paris
Germany Benjamin Schütze, Leibnitz Universität, Hannover
Greece Tatiana Eleni Synodinou, University of Cyprus
Hungary Dr. Eszter Kabai, head of Legal Department at Artisjus
Ireland N/A
Italy Valentina Moscon, University of Trento
Latvia Magda Papēde, Dr. iur. candidate at the University of Freiburg
Lithuania N/A
Luxemburg Bernd Justin Juette – University of Luxemburg
Malta Jeanine Rizzo, Fenech & Fenech Advocates, Valletta
Netherlands Anne Thier-Goubitz, IViR
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Norway Irina Eidsvold Tøien, Norwegian Research Center for Computers and Law, University of Oslo
Poland Krzysztof Siewicz –  Interdisciplinary Centre for Mathematical and Computational Modelling (ICM), University of Warsaw.
Portugal Alexandre L.D. Pereira, Law Faculty and Institute for Legal Research, Coimbra University, Portugal
Romania N/A
Slovakia Martin Husovec, European Information Society Institute, Vranov
Slovenia Maja Bogataj Jančič, Intellectual Property Institute (IPI), Ljubljana
Spain Raquel Xalabarder – Univresitat Oberta de Catalunya
Sweden Katarina Renman, Faculty of Law, Stockholm
Switzerland Yaniv Benhamou, Lenz & Staehellin, Geneva
United Kingdom Stavroula Karapapa, University of Reading
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